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MOTOR CARRIER DEREGULATION IN FLORIDA: BEFORE,
DURING AND AFTER
BRIAN J. DEFFENBAUGH*
JANE CAMERON HAYMAN**
I. INTRODUCTION
On July 1, 1980, chapter 323, Florida Statutes,' was repealed.2
The law had provided for regulation of intrastate motor carriers by
the Florida Public Service Commission (PSC).3 Since 1929, Florida
had regulated the entry into, rates for and safety of the business of
transporting persons or freight for hire over intrastate routes.' The
repeal of this regulation was pursuant to Florida's "sunset review"
process."
* B.A. in economics 1975, University of Notre Dame; J.D. with honors 1978, Florida State
University. Admitted to the Florida Bar (1978). Mr. Deffenbaugh currently serves as the
staff attorney with the Florida senate commerce committee and was the senate staff for the
1979 sunset review of motor carrier regulation.
** B.A., 1970, University of Florida; M.B.A., 1972, University of Florida; J.D. expected
1980, Florida State University.
1. (1979) (repealed 1980).
2. The repeal was mandated by the Regulatory Reform Act of 1976, ch. 76-168, § 3, 1976
Fla. Laws 295, as amended by Act of June 30, 1977, ch. 77-434, § 1, 1977 Fla. Laws 1846.
3. See FLA. STAT. ch. 323 (1979) (repealed 1980). The PSC has been known by other
names. Originally what is now the PSC was called the Railroad Commissioner. Act of June
7, 1887, ch. 3746, 1887 Fla. Laws 118. This designation was followed in 1947 by a change to
Florida Railroad and Public Utilities Commission. Act of June 16, 1947, ch. 24095, 1947 Fla.
Laws 1048. Then, in 1963 the name was changed to Florida Public Utilities Commission. Act
of June 3, 1963, ch. 63-279, 1963 Fla. Laws 656. Two years later the title finally became the
Florida Public Service Commission. Act of May 14, 1965, ch. 65-52, 1965 Fla. Laws 87 (cur-
rent version at FLA. STAT. § 350.001 (1979)).
4. See Act of July 1, 1929, ch. 13700, 1929 Fla. Laws 348.
5. The sunset process is retained in the Regulatory Reform Act of 1976, FLA. STAT.
§ 11.61-.6105 (1979). Florida's sunset law was the first state sunset enactment to become
effective. Price, Sunset Legislation in the United States, 30 BAYLOR L. REV. 401, 416 (1978).
Colorado was the first state to enact sunset legislation. However, Florida's law became effec-
tive prior to the Colorado provision. Id.
Sunset is a statutory process which automatically terminates governmental agencies and
programs. The legislature must enact saving legislation to prevent the nullification. Task
Force on Critical Problems, N.Y. Senate Research Service, Sunset ... Its [sic] not all Rosey
3 (April 1977). In Florida the process began with the enactment of the Regulatory Reform
Act of 1976, ch. 76-168, 1976 Fla. Laws 295 (current version at FLA. STAT. §§ 11.61-.6105
(1979)). As the name implies, the act affects only those businesses and professions which the
state licenses or regulates. FLA. STAT. § 11.61 (2)(a)(1979). (The scope of other state sunset
legislation ranges from an automatic repeal of all state functions to a termination of a few
selected agencies. Price, supra, at 426).
The act states the legislative intent, FLA. STAT. § 11.61(2) (1979), provides the procedure
for legislative review, id. § 11.61 (3)-(9), and specifies certain repeal dates for the enabling
legislation of the affected agencies and programs, id. § 11.6105. The act ' provides that:
(2) It is the intent of the Legislature:
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Florida thereby became the first and only state to deregulate
motor carriers.e New Jersey has always had minimal regulation of
certain types of carriers,7 and subject to voter approval of a consti-
tutional amendment, Arizona will also substantially deregulate mo-
(a) That no profession, occupation, business, industry, or other endeavor shall be
subject to the state's regulatory power unless the exercise of such power is neces-
sary to protect the public health, safety, or welfare from significant and discerni-
ble harm or damage. The exercise of the state's police power shall be done only to
the extent necessary for that purpose.
(6) That the state shall not regulate a profession, occupation, business, industry,
or other endeavor in a manner which will unreasonably [sic] adversely affect the
competitive market.
(c) To provide systematic legislative review of the need for, and the public bene-
fits derived from, a program or function which licenses or otherwise regulates the
initial entry into a profession, occupation, business, industry, or other endeavor by
a periodic review and termination, modification, or reestablishment of such pro-
grams and functions.
Id. § 11.61(2) (emphasis added).
Section 11.611(8) also provides that by January 1, 1977, the Speaker of the Florida House
of Representatives and the President of the Florida Senate were to appoint a select joint
committee to oversee the implementation of the act. Upon assignment by the Speaker and
the President, substantive committees of both Houses are responsible for performing the
required evaluation of the affected programs. Id. Review of the programs begins two years
prior to the respective repeal dates. Recommendations of the reviewing committees must be
completed by January 1 of the year of the repeal. These committees may suggest modifica-
tion, continuation or repeal of the programs. Id. § 11.61(7).
To decide whether to prevent the repeal, the legislature must consider six probing
questions:
(a) Would the absence of regulation significantly harm or endanger the public
health, safety, or welfare?
(b) Is there a reasonable relationship between the exercise of the state's police
power and the protection of the public health, safety, or welfare?
(c) Is there another, less restrictive method of regulation available which could
adequately protect the public?
(d) Does the regulation have the effect of directly or indirectly increasing the
costs of any goods or services involved and, if so, to what degree?
(e) Is the increase in cost more harmful to the public than the harm which
could result from the absence of regulation?
(f) Are all facets of the regulatory process designed solely for the purpose of,
and have as their primary effect, the protection of the public?
Id. § 11.61(4).
After this consideration, the legislature may reestablish the program or function for less
than six years. At the end of the specified period, the process begins again. Id. § 311.61(6).
The act also provides for the transition of repealed programs; i.e., if a program is abol-
ished, its funds and personnel remain for one year after the repeal, id. § 11.61(5); any cause
of action pertaining to the terminated program survives the repeal, id. § 11.61(9); the Flor-
ida Attorney General prosecutes these affected actions, id.
6. Telephone interview with Martin D. Zell, Deputy Director for State/Community Af-
fairs, Interstate Commerce Commission, Washington, D.C. (Sept. 10, 1980).
7. See generally W. Allen, S. Lonergan & D. Plane, Examination of the Unregulated
Trucking Experience in New Jersey (July, 1978) (available from Office of University Re-
search, U.S. Department of Transportation, Washington, D.C. 20590).
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tor carriers in 1982. 8
Those that favored Florida's motor carrier regulatory system
emphasized the stability and predictability of an economically reg-
ulated transportation system. Without economic regulation, it was
argued, destructive competition would result from an overly com-
petitive market. Stable and reasonable rates were cited as prefer-
able to the fluctuating and predatory pricing that would result
from unregulated rates. Another argument emphasized the obliga-
tion of a regulated carrier to serve small communities in its operat-
ing territory-service which would be threatened if regulation
ceased. 10 The general theme of proregulation advocates was the as-
surance of essential service at reasonable rates.
By contrast, those favoring deregulation emphasized the in-
creased operating efficiency, innovation in service, and overall de-
crease in rates that would result from reliance upon the free mar-
ket. Economic inefficiencies, such as empty backhauls, were said to
result from unreasonable restrictions of the operations of carriers.
Rate regulation was said to preclude price competition and to dis-
courage service innovation. Predatory pricing was discounted as
unlikely because rational economic behavior would dissuade large
carriers from charging rates below cost. If one carrier were driven
out of business, another carrier would soon enter when the large
carrier's rates began to climb. Behind these arguments was the
basic ideological aversion to subjecting prospective and existing
business persons to the burdens of restrictive governmental
regulation.1"
The aim of this article is to comprehensively review regulation as
it existed prior to the repeal, how the repeal occurred, and what
laws remain which affect intrastate motor carriers. The final sec-
tion is a summary of the statutes and common law that will now
"regulate" the motor carrier industry.
8. Ch. 203, § 1, 1979 Ariz. Sess. Laws 803 repeals Asiz. REv. STAT. § 40-601-620 on July
1, 1982, if ARiz. CONST. art. 15, § 2 is amended to remove the power of the Arizona Corpora-
tion Commission to regulate motor carriers.
9. See J. Mills, The Pros and Cons of Trucking Regulation 2-3 (reprint 95 March, 1979)
(available from American Enterprise Institute, 1150 17th Street N.W., Washington, D.C.
20036).
10. Id.
11. Id. at 304.
1980]
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II. HISTORY
A. General
Motor carrier regulation began on the local level in response to
the competition between the jitney and the street car. Street cars
were operating from municipal franchises which obligated these
railways to maintain the streets and to pay certain taxes.12 The
franchisees appealed to the municipalities for relief from the com-
petitive advantage engendered from the jitney operators' unregu-
lated status.18 The cities responded by creating obligations for
jitney operations: entry, bonding, safety, routes and hours of oper-
ation. 4 The states joined the regulatory process in 1915 with New
York leading the way.15 Its law defined a motor carrier as a com-
mon carrier and required the issuance of a certificate of conve-
nience and necessity prior to operation."'
By 1928, forty-three of the forty-eight states regulated passenger
motor carriage and thirty-three regulated freight transportation. 17
Four years later, in 1932, all states but one regulated passenger
transportation while thirty-nine regulated motor carriage of
freight.18 The primary pressure for regulation of motor carriers
came from the railroads through the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission because of the vigorous competition facing the railroads
from the growing trucking industry.19
B. Florida
In 1929, Florida authorized its Railroad Commission to regulate
motor carriers for hire.20 The original 1929 act required all persons
operating motor vehicles in the business of transporting persons or
property for compensation or as a common carrier in Florida to
12. Eckert & Hilton, The Jitneys, 15 J.L. & ECON. 293, 304 (1972).
13. Id. at 304.
14. Id. at 308-22.
15. Jones, Origins of the Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity: Develop-
ments in the States, 1870-1920, 79 CoLUM. L. REv. 426, 485 (1979).
16. Id. A certificate of convenience and necessity is the license to operate used by most
public utility regulatory agencies. Prior to issuance of the certificates, the agency usually
considers the price charged by the applicant, the number of competitors providing the ser-
vice of the applicant and the general public need for the service of the applicant. Id. at 426-
27.
17. T. MOORE, FREIGHT TRANSPORTATION REGULATION 25 (1972).
18. Id.
19. Id. at 26.
20. Act of July 1, 1929, ch. 13700, 1929 Fla. Laws 348.
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obtain a certificate of public convenience and necessity.2' Two
years later the United States Supreme Court in Smith v. Cahoon21
held this act unconstitutional on equal protection grounds because
no distinction was made between "common carriers" and "private
carriers for hire," which impermissibly subjected both types of car-
riers to identical obligations.2 3 Such regulation of the business of
private carriage was held to be "manifestly beyond the power of
the state. '2 4 Chief Justice Hughes' opinion offered little discussion
on the difference between the two types of carriers; however, he
noted that the appellant was employed under an exclusive contract
with one shipper and had never "held himself out" as a common
carrier."
The Florida Legislature responded in 1931 with an act which
provided three separate schemes of regulation of entry for "com-
mon carriers," "private contract carriers" and "for hire" carriers.2
The separation of regulation into three schemes did not prove to
be of major significance. The difference between "common car-
riers" and "private contract carriers" was slight in terms of regula-
tory barriers to entry. The applicability of "for hire" permitting
was increasingly limited. 7
21. Id. § 2.
22. 283 U.S. 553 (1931).
23. Id. at 566.
24. Id. at 563.
25. Id. at 561.
26. Act of June 15, 1931, ch. 14764, 1931 Fla. Laws 486. "Common carriers," left un-
defined, were required to obtain certificates of public convenience and necessity, and the
PSC was required to take into consideration the effect that the granting of such certificate
may have upon transportation facilities within the territory sought to be served by the ap-
plicant and the effect upon transportation within that territory. Id. § 3. "Private contract
carriers," defined as carriers which continuously or recurringly transport carriage under the
same contract, were also required to obtain certificates of public convenience and necessity.
The PSC was required to consider:
the effect that the granting of such certificate may have upon transportation facil-
ities within the territory sought to be served by said applicant, and/or congestion
of traffic on the highways, and/or safety of traffic moving on the highways under
such operations in relationship to other private and/or public traffic permitted by
law to move over the same roads or in the same territory, and also the effect upon
transportation as a whole within said territory.
Id. § 4. "For hire" carriers, defined as vehicles transporting persons or commodities for com-
pensation, could obtain a permit as a matter of right without proof of public convenience
and necessity. Id. § 5.
27. In 1949 the definition of "for hire" was amended to limit permitting as a matter of
right to transportation for compensation in "single, casual, and non recurring [sic] trips."
Act of June 13, 1949, ch. 25418, § 1, 1949 Fla. Laws 1017. Furthermore, "for hire" permit-
ting for transportation of passengers was specifically limited to transportation in vehicles
with a capacity of seven passengers or less. Id. § 1. In 1977 a major revision of ch. 323
19801
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The 1929 and 1931 acts did not specify the intent of the legisla-
ture. However, the Florida Supreme Court found an opportunity to
express its interpretation of the Act's policy in Florida Motor
Lines, Inc. v. State Railroad Commission.2 a It found that mainte-
nance of taxpayer supported roads and safety of the public was
paramount in the legislative mind.
Until recent years public transportation facilities for hire in
Florida were afforded almost entirely by railroad and boat lines;
the use of vehicles on the public roads in the state for transporta-
tion of persons and property for compensation being relatively
negligible. Since motor vehicles have come into general utility and
the construction of hard-surface highways throughout the state
with public funds, the business of using such vehicles in the
transportation of persons and property for compensation over the
public roads in the state has attained such proportions as to re-
quire statutory regulation to conserve the roads and safety in the
use of them by the public.2 '
A later decision emphasized the economic protectionism in-
tended for existing carriers.
It is not the policy of [the law] to encourage destructive competi-
tion with existing transportation facilities and thereby decrease or
destroy such existing services and deprive the general public
thereof. The policy of the law is to avoid duplication of invest-
ments and maintenance and operating expenses and avoid inordi-
deleted the definition of "for hire" and limited permitting as a matter of right to only four
specific types of transportation. Act of June 30, 1977, ch. 77-434, § 8, 1977 Fla. Laws 1767
(current version at FLA. STAT. § 323.05 (1979) (repealed 1980)). The types of carriers which
received permits as a matter of right were (1) motor carriers engaged exclusively under con-
tract with the United States government, (2) motor carriers engaged exclusively in carrying
property consisting of ordinary livestock, seafood or agricultural products (excluding those
that were frozen or processed), (3) transportation purely incidental to a person's primary
business of maintenance, repair or installation, provided such transportation is in a single,
casual and nonrecurring trip and required the performance of substantial services in addi-
tion to transportation, and (4) transportation of houses and buildings formerly attached to
realty, not including mobile homes or manufactured housing. Id. In addition, the 1977
revision reflected actual practice by placing common carriers and contract carriers under
identical entry requirements. Id. § 4 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 323.05 (1979) (repealed
1980)). The law also provided a definition of common carrier for the first time: "any person
engaged in motor carrier transportation of persons or property for compensation over the
public highways of this state who holds his services out to the public and provides transpor-
tation over regular or irregular routes." Id. § 1 (current version at FLA. STAT. §
323.01(19)(1979) (repealed 1980)).
28. 132 So. 851 (Fla. 1931).
29. Id. at 857.
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nate commercial traffic on the highways that will tend to conges-
tion and danger to traffic in general. Where a new carrier seeks to
enter despite the fact that another is in the field, it is therefore
generally held to be necessary for it to show that the existing ser-
vice is not adequate to serve the public need."
III. MOTOR CARRIER REGULATION IN FLORIDA-PRE-SUNSET
A. Entry
Obtaining a certificate of public convenience and necessity was
no easy matter. As the name implied, the granting of these certifi-
cates was limited to what public convenience and necessity re-
quired. Relevant criteria for meeting this standard have been in
the statutes since the original 1929 act."' The statutes had always
specified that the primary focus was not upon the applicant's qual-
ities, but upon existing carriers-how good a job they were doing,
and how badly their business would be hurt. In fact, from 1931 to
1977 the only listed statutory factors dealt with existing carriers
and made no mention of the applicant's qualifications.82 Un-
changed during this earlier period was the following proviso:
"[Tihe commission in granting any such certificate shall take into
consideration the effect that the granting of such certificate may
have upon transportation facilities within the territory sought to
be served by said applicant, and also the effect upon transporta-
tion as a whole within said territory."' s
A 1977 amendment revised the entry criteria, listing six separate
factors which the PSC was required to consider.8 4 For the first
30. Central Truck Lines, Inc. v. Railroad Comm'n, 160 So. 26, 30 (Fla. 1935).
31. Act of July 1, 1929, ch. 13700, § 2, 1929 Fla. Laws 349.
32. Act of June 15, 1931, ch. 14764, § 3, 1931 Fla. Laws 488.
33. Ch. 14764, § 3, 1931 Fla. Laws 488.
34. Act of June 30, 1977, ch. 77-434, §4, 1977 Fla. Laws 1767 (current version at FLA.
STAT. § 323.03(4) (1979) (repealed 1980)). The six factors were:
(a) Whether existing transportation service of all kinds is adequate to meet
the reasonable public needs.
(b) The present necessity for the certificate in relation to the volume of ex-
isting or projected future traffic over such route or in such territory.
(c) The financial ability of the applicant to furnish adequate, continuous, and
uninterrupted service at the times required therefor, and to meet the financial
obligations of the service which the carrier proposes to perform.
(d) The effect on existing transportation facilities and service of all kinds, and
particularly whether the granting of such certificates will or may seriously impair
essential public service as provided by existing motor carriers.
(e) The fitness of the applicant properly to perform the proposed service and
to conform to provisions of this part and the rules of the [PSC].
(f) The feasibility of the transportation proposed.
1980]
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time the statutes referred to the fitness and financial ability of the
applicant, but the effect of competition on existing transportation
remained a relevant factor.
If the effect on existing transportation was important, the ade-
quacy of existing service was paramount. Virtually unchanged
throughout the history of the law was the following mandate to the
commission:
When application is made by an Auto Transportation Company
for a certificate to operate in a territory or on a line already
served by a certificate holder under this Act the Commission shall
grant same only when the existing certificate holder or holders
serving such territory fail to provide service and facilities to the
satisfaction of said Commission."
By reading the plain words of the statute, the courts consistently
held that it was necessary for the commission to find that existing
transportation was inadequate before a new certificate could be
granted.36 One of the first reported cases interpreting this provi-
sion explained that it was not the policy of the state to encourage
"destructive competition" with existing carriers, rather the policy
was to avoid duplication of investments, maintenance and operat-
ing expenses.3 7
The burden was on the applicant to show that existing carriers
were failing to provide reasonably adequate facilities and ser-
vices. 8 This was often a difficult burden to meet. In the case of
Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Mason,"9 the commission granted the
extension of an applicant's certificate based upon the testimony of
a potential shipper who desired the services of the applicant and
who felt that existing carriers could not satisfactorily provide the
services. 0 In fact, the shipper stated that if the application were
denied, it would resort to private employment rather than take ad-
Id.
35. Act of July 1, 1929, ch. 13700, § 3, 1929 Fla. Laws 348 (current version at FLA. STAT.
§ 323.03(5) (1979) (repealed 1980)) (emphasis added).
36. See generally Blocker's Transfer & Storage Co. v. Yarborough, 277 So. 2d 9 (Fla.
1973); Wells Fargo Armored Serv. Corp. v. Mason, 196 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 1967); Commercial
Carrier Corp. v. Mason, 177 So. 2d 337 (Fla. 1965); Greyhound Corp. v. Carter, 124 So. 2d 9
(Fla. 1960); Great S. Trucking Co. v. Mack, 54 So. 2d 153 (Fla. 1951).
37. Central Truck Lines, Inc. v. Railroad Comm'n, 160 So. 26, 30 (Fla. 1935).
38. Stewart Bonded Warehouse, Inc. v. Bevis, 294 So. 2d 315, 318 (Fla. 1974).
39. 177 So. 2d 337 (Fla. 1965).
40. Id. at 339.
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vantage of the available service.4 The court nevertheless reversed
the commission's order granting the extension of the certificate,
finding nothing in the record to support the commission's conclu-
sion that existing service was inadequate.4" The opinion stated that
the "wishes, preferences or feelings of [the shipper] or any other
shipper in support of a particular carrier applicant are not enough
absent an evidentiary factual showing that the application meets
statutory standards."4 In this case and others it was held that ex-
isting carriers must have a reasonable opportunity to demonstrate
that they were able to render satisfactory service to a shipper prior
to the issuance of a certificate to another carrier.44 Later cases did
make it clear, however, that this rule did not mandate that the
commission first require, or formally require, such service if ex-
isting carriers had had an opportunity to provide service and had
failed to do so.45
Existing carriers were given ample opportunity to prove that
they were providing adequate service and that their business would
be hurt by the granting of a new certificate. Upon the filing of an
application, the PSC was required to give notice to all motor car-
riers serving any part of the proposed route.4" Any substantially
affected person could file a protest within thirty days of notice. If
one or more protests were filed, the PSC was required to hold a
hearing between twenty and ninety days of notice. If one or more
protests were filed, the PSC was required to hold a hearing be-
tween twenty and ninety days after the notices were served.'7
Hearings would generally be held before hearing examiners em-
ployed by the PSC, who submitted their findings to the commis-
sioners for consideration in determining the final order.'8
41. Id. at 338.
42. Id. at 340.
43. Id. at 339-40.
44. Id. at 339. See also Tamiami Trail Tours v. Carter, 80 So. 2d 322, 329 (Fla. 1955);
Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Mack, 73 So. 2d 416, 420 (Fla. 1954).
45. American Sightseeing Tours, Inc. v. Mayo, 326 So. 2d 168, 171 (Fla. 1976); Alterman
Transp. Line v. Carter, 88 So. 2d 594, 596 (Fla. 1955).
46. FLA. STAT. § 323.03(2) (1979) (repealed 1980). This section also required that notice
be given to the mayor or chief magistrate of each city and town in or through which the
applicant desired to operate, to the chairman of the board of county commissioners of each
county in which the proposed service would be operated and to the Florida Department of
Transportation. Id.
47. Id.
48. See FLA. STAT. § 120.57(1)(a)2 (1979), which exempted the PSC from the require-
ment that hearing officers assigned by the Division of Administrative Hearings of the Flor-
ida Department of Administration must conduct all formal hearings in which substantial
interests of a party are determined. This exemption was eliminated by the 1980 Legislature.
1980]
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The law required that every operating certificate granted must
specify the territory and highways in and over which the grantee
was permitted to operate, the specific commodities to be trans-
ported, and any additional conditions deemed by the PSC to be
necessary or proper and in the public interest.' 9 In practice, carri-
ers protesting an application would have a significant impact on
the type of authority eventually granted, not only as participants
in the administrative process, but outside the process as well. After
an application was submitted and protests filed, the parties would
often reach a private agreement whereby the protesting carriers
would agree to withdraw their protests in exchange for the appli-
cant's amendment to his application."0 In this way, existing car-
riers could persuade prospective competitors to eliminate certain
routes, territories, or commodities from the operations applied for,
thereby eliminating or diminishing the threat of competition. Bar-
gaining of this kind would often result in operating certificates pro-
viding for circuitous routing, "closed-door" restrictions by which
certain areas had to be traveled without loading or unloading, and
commodity restrictions which very narrowly limited the types of
goods which a carrier was authorized to transport. Such operating
restrictions could cause a carrier to travel empty ("deadhead") on
the backhaul of return trip.51
Regulation of entry by the PSC proved to be a significant barrier
to those persons desiring to enter the motor carrier transportation
business.52 Statistics indicate that applicants for new authority
seldom obtained the authority originally requested, and often ob-
tained no authority at all.58
Act of July 1, 1980, ch. 80-289, Fla. Laws 1244.
49. FLA. STAT. § 323.03(7) (1979) (repealed 1980).
50. Staff of the Florida Senate Commerce Committee, A Review of Chapter 323, Florida
Statutes Motor Carriers and Freight Forwards 32 (January 1980) (Senate Report) (available
at committee office, Tallahassee, Fl.) [hereinafter cited as Senate Report].
51. See id. at 40.
52. See id. at 33-35.
53.
Statistical Analysis of the Application Process
The first table below breaks down the applications for common carriers and the
second table breaks down the applications for contract carriers.
DISPOSITION OF COMMON CARRIER
CERTIFICATE APPLICATIONS FOR 1974-1979
1974-75 1975-76 1976-77 1977-78 1978-79
Applications for 47 41 56 117 165
New Authority
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B. Rates
In addition to regulation of entry, the PSC was authorized to
Applications for 47 35 28 26 49
Extended Authority
TOTAL COMMON CARRIER
CERTIFICATE APPLICATIONS 94 76 84 143 214
FILED
Granted as filed 47 (50%) 42 (55%) 39 (46%) 54 (38%) 94 (44%)
Granted with 6 (6%) 1 (1%) 25 (30%) 58 (41%) 75 (35%)
Modifications
Withdrawn 14 (15%) 14 (18%) 6 (7%) 19 (13%) 33 (15%)
Denied 27 (29%) 19 (25%) 14 (17%) 12 (8%) 12 (6%)
Source: Public Service Commission
DISPOSITION OF CONTRACT CARRIER
CERTIFICATE APPLICATIONS FOR 1974-1979
1974-75 1975-76 1976-77 1977-78 1978-79
Applications for 14 9 11 23 30
New Authority
Applications for 2 2 3 5 8
Extended Authority
TOTAL CONTRACT CARRIER
CERTIFICATE 16 11 14 28 38
APPLICATIONS FILED
Granted as filed 11 (69%) 8 (73%) 7 (50%) 14 (50%) 30 (79%)
Granted with 0 1 (9%) 1 (7%) 10 (36%) 4 (11%)
Modifications
Withdrawn 2 (13%) 1 (9%) 3 (21%) 2 (7%) 2 (5%)
Denied 3 (19%) 1 (9%) 4 (29%) 2 (7%) 1 (3%)
Source: Public Service Commission
As can be seen from the first table, slightly less than half, 47 percent, of the
common carrier applications were granted as filed over the last five years. Appli-
cants for contract carriage have a much better chance at receiving the operating
authority requested. As shown by the second table, 64 percent of the contract
carrier applications were granted as filed over the last five years.
It would be incorrect, however, to assume from these statistics that an applicant
for a common carrier certificate has nearly a 50-50 chance of receiving the author-
ity sought. One reason is that the tables do not separately break down the disposi-
tion of applications for new authority and extended authority. Applicants for new
authority have a much more difficult time receiving the authority requested than
do existing certificate holders seeking extended authority. A second reason why
the statistics may be somewhat misleading is due to the "Silco applicants" who
were "grandfathered" in. . . . [Djue to a 1975 court decision, [Petroleum Carrier
Corp. v. Silco Petroleum Carrier, Inc., 312 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1975)J intracity carriers were no longer deemed to be exempt and therefore had to
apply to the PSC for certificates. The Performance Audit prepared by the Office
of the Auditor General [Florida Office of the Auditor General, Performance Audit
of the State Program for Motor Carrier Regulation (Nov. 2, 1978)] reviewed the
applications disposed of in 1977. The following table from this report distin-
guishes the applications by the type of applicant. The first row of the table shows
the disposition of applications for persons not presently certified and who were
not "Silco" applicants. Only 12.5 percent of these applications were granted as
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regulate the rates charged by certified motor carriers." The statu-
tory authority provided in section 323.07, for rate regulation was
very broad: "The commission may supervise and regulate every
motor carrier in the state operating under the authority of this
part, fix or approve the rates, fares, charges, classifications, rules
and regulations for such motor carriers .... .,,M In conjunction
with this broad grant of rate authority, section 323.08, outlined the
standards and procedures for fixing and changing rates for all but
four types of carriers." This section required all rates to be "just,
reasonable and compensatory," for which the PSC was authorized
to consider the "efficiency, sufficiency, and adequacy" of the facili-
ties and equipment provided and services rendered, as well as the
value of such services to the public.17 However, no motor carrier
could be denied reasonable earnings, as measured by intrastate
revenues, expenses, operating ratio, and cost of capital."8 In prac-
tice, the operating ratio which represented the ratio of operating
costs to operating revenue, was the usual measure for reasonable
earnings.59 An operating ratio between ninety and ninety-five per-
requested (although 56.3 percent received some type of authority).
From Application Dockets Closed in 1977
Status Disposition Granted Partly Total Denied Withdrawn
of of as Granted COPCANS
Applicant Application Requested Granted
Non-certificated,
Non-Silco Applicants 12.5% 43.8% 56.3% 28.1% 15.6%
Silco Applicants 10.7% 78.6% 89.3% 0% 10.7%
Certificate Holders 42.2% 36.8% 79.0% 10.5% 10.5%
Total 23.5% 51.0% 74.5% 13.3% 12.2%
Source: Office of the Auditor General
The above information was taken from Senate Report, supra note 50, at 33-35.
54. See FLA. STAT. § 323.07 (1979) (repealed 1980).
55. Id.
56. The four types of carriers were (1) armored cars, (2) construction aggregate haulers,
(3) charter buses, and (4) newspaper carriers. FLA. STAT. § 323.08(3)-(4) (1979) (repealed
1980).
57. Id. § 323.08(2)(b).
58. Id.
59. Florida Office of the Auditor General, Performance Audit of the State Program for
Motor Carrier Regulation 81 (Nov. 2, 1978) [hereinafter cited as Auditor General Report].
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cent was generally considered to be a reasonable level of earnings."
Pursuant to the procedures outlined in section 323.08, a carrier
filed a proposed rate change with the PSC which it could suspend
while a final order was pending; or the PSC could approve, disap-
prove or modify the proposal."" The PSC applied this procedure
only to "a general rate increase," defined by rule as "a proposal to
change all or substantially all of the tariff provisions."2 A tariff
was defined as the publication containing all of the individual fares
and charges for transporting specific commodities at various dis-
tances and weights." By rule the PSC outlined an abbreviated pro-
cedure for tariff filings that were not deemed to be general rate
increases. e '
Although the statutes did not address the subject, rates were
either filed by individual carriers or by rate bureaus.6 Ten differ-
ent rate bureaus filed rates on behalf of approximately seventy
percent of the carriers which had rates on file with the PSC." Pur-
suant to rule, all rate bureaus had to be approved by the PSC.e
The rate bureau would hold hearings for any tariff proposal, send-
ing notice to all members and interested parties. If a proposal was
adopted, it was sent to the PSC for consideration and, if approved,
it would be thereafter followed by all members of the rate bureau.
A bureau member also had the right to take "independent action"
if he desired to use a different tariff from that of the bureau. How-
ever, notice of this intention had to be made to the bureau and to
each of the members."
60. Id.
61. FLA. STAT. § 323.08 (1979). The PSC had 30 days within which to suspend the pro-
posed rate. If the PSC did nothing within this 30-day period, the new rates automatically
went into effect. If the PSC did suspend the rate change, it had up to eight months within
which to issue a final order, or else the new rates could be placed into effect under bond. At
a later date the PSC could order a refund of any rates charged that were found not to be
unjustified. No statutory time limit was placed on this final order. Id.
62. FLA. ADMIN. CODS Rs. 25-5.130(3), .131.
63. Id. at 25-5.130(2).
64. See id. at 25-5.138. The proposed tariff had to be submitted 30 days prior to its
effective date, and anyone wishing to protest had to do so at least 12 days prior to its effec-
tive date. If no action was taken by the PSC the rate automatically went into effect after 30
days. Id. at 25-5.138 § 2. If the PSC suspended the tariff, a final order had to be issued
within seven months; otherwise the tariff filing went into effect at the end of the period. Id.
at 25-5.138(4)(b).
65. Senate Report, supra note 50, at 53.
66. Id.
67. FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 25-5.132.
68. Id. at 25-5.133.
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The PSC strongly encouraged carriers to join rate bureaus.69 In
1978, however, the PSC began a neutral policy on rate bureau
membership, complying with an Attorney General Opinion which
stated that the rules authorizing rate filing by bureaus were valid
only to the extent that the rules did not limit the unrestrained
right of motor carriers to submit individual tariff filings.70 The
opinion also stated that rate bureaus were not immune from the
state antitrust law, chapter 542, Florida Statutes.7
Statistics on PSC disposition of rate requests in recent years
indicate that practically every tariff filing became effective without
PSC action or ultimately became effective after an initial
suspension.7
C. Safety
Sections 323.07 and 323.13, Florida Statutes, granted the PSC
broad safety authority over carriers operating under certificates or
permits,7 in addition to requiring certain safety equipment." With
certain minor exceptions, the PSC adopted by reference the safety
standards for construction, maintenance, and operation of motor
vehicles prescribed by the Federal Department of Transporta-
tion.76 These federal rules are quite comprehensive, dealing with
driver qualifications, driver condition while operating the vehicle,
required safety equipment, reporting and recording requirements
for accidents, hours of service or drivers, inspection, repair and
maintenance of the vehicles, and transportation of hazardous
materials.77
69. Auditor General Report, supra note 59, at 83.
70. 78-53 Op. ATT'v GEN. 1, 5 (March 28, 1978).
71. Id. at 16.
72. (1979).
73. See Senate Report, supra note 50, at 57. Of the 1200 tariff filings from January,
1978, to October, 1979, 1184 became effective without PSC action and four more ultimately
became effective after an initial suspension. Id. at 56. Only five filings were ordered can-
celled, two were withdrawn, and one was pending. From January, 1978, through December
15, 1979, 45 additional filings were deemed to be general rate requests. Of these, 10 became
effective without PSC action and seven were granted after a hearing. Only four were re-
jected as improper and three were withdrawn. The remaining 21 filings were pending as of
December 15, 1979. Id. at 55-56.
74. FLA. STAT. § 323.07 (1979).
75. Id. at § 323.13. "The commission may prescribe and require as standard on all vehi-
cles operated by motor carriers under its permits or certificates all necessary safety devices
. ' Id.
76. See FLA. AnMN. CoDE R. 25-5.110 (adopting 49 C.F.R. §§ 390-97 (1975) (with
exceptions)).
77. See 49 C.F.R. §§ 390-97 (1975).
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Safety regulations were enforced by seventy-two investigators
hired by the PSC who were armed, uniformed and vested with the
powers of deputy sheriffs to stop any vehicle on the highway to
check and inspect the vehicle and any related documents.78 The
investigators had the power to make arrests and to issue citations
to appear before the PSC.7 9 Enforcement of PSC regulations was
accomplished through check points, patrols, and temporary block-
ades. 0 If a violation were found, the driver found to be in violation
could be arrested, issued a citation to appear before the PSC, is-
sued a warning requiring the defect to be corrected, or the vehicle
could be placed out of service.81 Much of the enforcement activity
involved a verification of a carrier's authority rather than safety.8 2
Of the 5,339 arrests made in 1978, 2,313 were made for operating
without proper authority.8
3
D. Other Areas of Regulation
In addition to the regulation of entry, rates, and safety, chapter
323 imposed other types of regulation on motor carriers. Carriers
were subject to a road tax which imposed an annual flat fee per
vehicle." Also, the chapter required the PSC to fix bond or insur-
ance requirements for the protection of the passengers and freight
carried in the vehicle, and for the protection of the public against
injury caused by the negligent operation of the vehicle. 85
78. Senate Report, supra note 50, at 63.
79. FLA. STAT. § 323.21 (1979) (repealed 1980).
80. Senate Report, supra note 50, at 63.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 64.
83. Id.
84. FLA. STAT. § 323.15 (1979) (repealed 1980). The forerunner of the road tax was the
mileage tax which was replaced in 1965 with the road tax in order to decrease administra-
tive and compliance costs. See Florida Senate Ways and Means Committee, Florida Tax
Handbook 1979 33 (March 1979) (available in committee office, Tallahassee, Fl.). Approxi-
mately $2.6 million was collected under this tax in fiscal year 1978-79. Senate Report, supra
note 50, at 65. After an initial 4% of the funds collected were deposited in general revenue,
63% were deposited in the Revenue Sharing Fund for counties, FLA. STAT. § 215.20 (1979),
35% in the Florida Public Service Regulatory Trust Fund, and 2% in the Revenue Sharing
Fund for municipalities. Id. § 323.16 (1979) (repealed 1980).
85. FLA. STAT. § 323.06 (1979) (repealed 1980). By rule, the commission set liability in-
surance requirements of $100,000 for bodily injury to one person, $300,000 for bodily injury
to all persons in one accident, and $50,000 for physical damage liability excluding cargo.
Cargo damage liability insurance was required in the amount of $2500 for cargo carried by
one vehicle and $5000 for one occurrence. Busses of thirteen passenger capacity or more
were required to carry $100,000/$500,000 bodily injury liability coverage and $50,000 physi-
cal damage liability coverage. FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 2-5.31(4).
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In addition to the regulation of motor carriers themselves, chap-
ter 323 authorized the PSC to regulate two other related profes-
sions-transportation brokersas and freight forwarders.87 A trans-
portation broker is one who finds transportation services for a
shipper"8 and was required to be licensed by the PSC. A freight
forwarder assembles small shipments of cargo and arranges for its
transportation in truckload quantities.89 Persons desiring to be
freight forwarders were required to obtain a certificate of authority
also.9"
E. Exemptions
Certain types of motor carriers were completely exempt from
regulation by the PSC.1 In other words, the PSC had no control
over the entry, rates, safety or other aspects of these carriers'
operations.
The 1931 act contained a list of exempt carriers which was pre-
ceded by the following phrase: "transportation exempted in this
section is casual, seasonal and not on regular routes or schedules, is
slow moving, frequently in special equipment, and for compara-
86. See FLA. STAT. § 323.31 (1979) (repealed 1980).
87. See id. § 323.51-68.
88. Id. § 323.31(1) (1979) (repealed 1980). An applicant was required to show that issu-
ance of a license would be consistent with the public convenience and necessity, for which
the PSC was required to consider the effect the proposed service would have upon transpor-
tation brokerage as a whole within the area sought to be served. Id. § 323.31(2). In addition,
the applicant was required to meet the following qualifications:
1. He has had a minimum of I year experience in the office of a licensed trans-
portation broker or I year of experience as a truck owner or driver in the field of
motor transportation.
2. He has not been convicted of engaging in the business of transportation bro-
kerage without a proper license in the past 12 months; and no legal proceedings
are pending against him for violation of this section.
3. He has not been engaged as the owner, partner, officer, or director of a pred-
ecessor company operating as a transportation broker within the past 12 months
which has become insolvent, been adjudged as bankrupt, or has unsatisfied judg-
ments against it.
4. He has attached to his application as a part thereof a current financial
statement prepared and signed by a certified public accountant showing a mini-
mum net worth of $5,000 and adequate financial means to operate successfully as
a transportation broker.
Id. § 323.31(3)(a).
89. Id. § 323.52(1).
90. Id. § 323.54(1). Again the standard was public convenience and necessity, for which
the PSC was required to consider the public need for the service, the ability and financial
reponsibility of the applicant, and the effect the proposed service would have upon existing
transportation services. Id. § 323.54(5).
91. Id. § 323.29.
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tively short distances over the improved highways of the State."'
This statutory expression of the intent to exempt certain vehicles
from regulation remained unchanged until 1977 when it was
amended simply to read, "the following transportation shall not be
subject to the requirements of chapter 323.""- The legislature ap-
parently realized that no common characteristic existed among the
diversified exemptions.
Exemptions from regulation in the 1931 act that were main-
tained throughout the history of the law (with certain modifica-
tions) included (1) school busses, (2) transportation of agricultural
and horticultural goods, seafood, dairy products, logs, and lumber
from the point of production to the point of primary manufacture
or assemblage; or from the point of production, primary manufac-
ture, or assemblage to a shipping point, (3) privately owned motor
vehicles carrying the owner's or operator's goods, and (4) motor
vehicles operating within the limits of any city or town and the
adjoining suburban territory, where the transportation was regu-
lated by the city or town."
The intra-municipal exemption was significantly limited in 1975
in Petroleum Carrier Corp. v. Silco Petroleum Carrier, Inc.a1 The
court interpreted the language in the statutory exemption for in-
tra-municipal transportation "where such business of carriage is
regulated by the legislative body of such cities or towns."" Look-
ing at the purpose of the act, the court concluded that the mere
adoption of safety standards by a city did not constitute regulation
of the "business of carriage" contemplated by the exemption."
The opinion implied that full regulation of entry under the stan-
dards of chapter 323 was required."a As a result of this case, those
92. Act of June 15, 1931, ch. 14764, § 30, 1931 Fla. Laws 486.
93. Act of June 30, 1977, ch. 77-434, § 20, 1977 Fla. Laws 1767.
94. See Act of June 15, 1931, ch. 14764, §§ 30-31, 1931 Fla. Laws 486, which is similar to
FLA. STAT. § 323.29(1)-(3), (5) (1979) (repealed 1980).
95. 312 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
96. Id. at 459 (emphasis in original).
97. Id. at 460 (emphasis in original).
98. Id. at 461. The opinion stated:
Appellee contends that regulation of petroleum carriers in the City of Jackson-
ville, other than as to safety is unnecessary; that if the checks and balances of
competition in Jacksonville between the various independent carriers is such that
the general public is well served, there is no need to require regulation. This con-
tention that open competition between carriers (or certain types of carriers) is
good and should be allowed is a philosophical one that flies in the face of the
Motor Carrier Act and should be addressed to the legislature rather than to the
court.
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intra-municipal carriers previously deemed exempt were now re-
quired to obtain certificates of public convenience and necessity.
The PSC treated the operations of existing carriers as evidence of
public convenience and necessity and, in effect, "grandfathered in"
those carriers. 9"
By the time of the 1980 repeal, the list of exempt carriers had
grown significantly. In addition to the four types of carriers already
mentioned, the following types of transportation (with certain
technical distinctions not mentioned) were included: (1) motor ve-
hicles used exclusively in transporting agricultural or horticultural
products directly to the consumers or growers, (2) motor vehicles
used exclusively in transporting ice for use in the packing of agri-
cultural or horticultural commodities for further shipment, (3)
hearses and ambulances, (4) wreckers, (5) motor vehicles operated
by a manufacturer's dealer to transport heavy equipment to and
from his own garage and repair shops at the request of the owner,
(6) U.S. mail trucks, and (7) dump trucks of a ten-ton capacity or
less.100
IV. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 1980 DEREGULATION
A. Background
By providing for the automatic repeal of chapter 323, the Regu-
latory Reform Act of 1976 guaranteed a review of the need for mo-
tor carrier regulation. This review was performed by the legislature
with the aid of other governmental agencies.
One of the most comprehensive studies used by the legislature in
evaluating motor carrier regulation was the performance audit of
motor carrier regulation issued on November 2, 1978, by the Flor-
ida Office of the Auditor General. 01 This audit generally concluded
that economic regulation of some segments of the industry was un-
necessary to safeguard the public's health, safety, and welfare. 10"
The only type of carriers for which regulation might be necessary
were the "less-than-truckload" (LTL) carriers operating between
commercial zones.103 In regard to rate regulation, the audit con-
99. Auditor General Report, supra note 59, at 46.
100. FLA. STAT. § 323.29 (4), (6)-(13) (1979) (repealed 1980).
101. See Auditor General Report, note 59 supra.
102. See id. at 13, 34-38.
103. Id. at 35. This conclusion was based on the fact that LTL carriers have some of the
classical characteristics of a public utility. For example, large initial capital investment in
fixed assets, such as terminals, limits entry and makes it inefficient for two carriers to oper-
ate in a given area. In addition, unlike truckload shippers who may be able to buy or lease
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cluded that the public bore unnecessary costs in the form of state-
sanctioned cartel pricing caused by regulation of those segments of
the industry that were naturally competitive and better left to the
control of the free market.1
The PSC also reviewed the regulation of motor carriers and sub-
mitted its recommendations to the legislature in the form of a sug-
gested bill, the first draft of which was completed on November 19,
1979, and submitted to the legislature on December 7, 1979.105 The
PSC made the following major recommendations regarding entry:
(1) delete the statutory language which prohibited the granting of
a certificate unless the PSC determined that existing carriers are
not providing adequate services, (2) place the burden on a protes-
tant to prove that the granting of a certificate would adversely af-
fect existing service, (3) establish "general principles" in the stat-
ute listing the type of restrictions which should not be forced on
carriers' operations, and (4) eliminate the requirement that a pas-
senger carrier have regular route service before it may obtain char-
ter bus authority.106 In regard to the regulation of rates, the com-
missioners recommended that they be authorized to adopt a "zone
of reasonableness" approach to rate setting.107 Under this ap-
proach, the PSC would set minimum and maximum rates within
which carriers could set their own rates. It was also recommended
trucks, the public does not have alternative means of transport. Id. at 30. Thus, a monopoly
situation would result for LTL shippers in the absence of regulation. Id. at 30-31. For these
carriers, the audit recommended that the entry process place greater weight on a carrier's
ability to operate efficiently and to provide convenient transportation services, and that the
burden be placed on presently certified carriers to prove their injury if an application were
granted. Id. at 58-60.
104. Id. at 13, 93.
105. Letter from Robert T. Mann, Chairman of the PSC to Phillip D. Lewis, President
of the Florida Senate (Dec. 7, 1979) (on file with Fla. S. Committee on Commerce, Tallahas-
see, Fl.). The nine bills referenced in Chairman Mann's letter refer to all of the PSC func-
tions under sunset review for 1980. Chapter 323 was one of the nine topics. See Suggested
PSC draft legislation (Nov. 19, 1979) (available at Fla. S. Committee on Commerce Office)
[hereinafter cited as PSC draft legislation].
Although the PSC revised its proposed bill several times, the basic recommendations re-
mained unchanged. While it was represented that the recommendations were from the five
commissioners as a group, Chairman Robert Mann made it clear that his personal prefer-
ence was for a much larger scale deregulation than that offered by the suggested bill. Fla. S.
Committee on Commerce, tape recording of proceedings (Oct. 15, 1979) (on file with com-
mittee) (comments by Robert Mann, Chairman of the PSC). The PSC advocated legislative
changes, unlike the Office of the Auditor General which presented its findings and recom-
mendations without making any affirmative attempt to "lobby" the legislature. See gener-
ally Auditor General Report, supra note 59, at iii.
106. PSC draft legislation, supra note 105, at 14-25.
107. Id. at 44.
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that rate bureaus be expressly authorized and be exempted from
the state antitrust law.108 Concerning safety, the PSC recom-
mended that its authority to regulate safety be expanded to in-
clude carriers currently listed as exempt from all PSC
regulation.' o9
B. The Senate
On the Senate side of the Florida legislature, the Office of the
Senate President directed the Senate Commerce Committee to
perform sunset review of chapter 323.110 Between September 10,
1979 and March 12, 1980, the Senate Commerce Committee,
chaired by Senator W. D. Childers, held six meetings exclusively
on the subject of motor carrier regulation."' The staff of the Sen-
ate Commerce Committee began studying the subject in the sum-
mer of 1979 and issued a staff report in January, 1980.112 The staff
report's recommendations included (1) eliminating demonstrated
need for the applicant's service as a relevant factor upon entry,113
(2) providing a statutory list of prohibited operating restrictions, 11
(3) removing the restriction imposed upon passenger carriers re-
quiring that regular route authority be a prerequisite to obtaining
charter authority,"5 (4) prohibiting rate bureaus1 6 and (5) ex-
empting various types of carriers, including contract carriers and
single vehicles weighing less than 10,000 pounds.11 7
The first four meetings of the Senate Commerce Committee
were devoted entirely to public testimony. Representatives of the
trucking and shipping industry took advantage of this, particularly
at the meeting of February 18, 1980. At that meeting, fourteen rep-
resentatives of trucking companies and businesses that used their
services testified in favor of continued regulation, (as compared to
one representative of a tour bus operation who complained of re-
108. Id. at 42.
109. Id. at 41, 68.
110. Memorandum from Howard Walton of the Office of the Florida Senate President to
Fred Martin, Staff Director of the Fla. S. Committee on Commerce (June 25, 1979).
111. Senate Commerce Committee meetings on motor carrier regulation were held on
September 10 & October 15, 1979; January 8, February 18-19 & March 12, 1980. Fla. S.
Committee on Commerce, committee reports for these dates (on file with committee).
112. See Senate Report, note 50 supra.
113. Id. at 37.
114. Id. at 43.
115. Id. at 50.
116. Id. at 58.
117. Id. at 62.
19801 MOTOR CARRIER DEREGULATION
strictive regulations, one man who complained of the PSC's delay
in acting upon his application for a certificate and a representative
of Common Cause who supported major regulatory reform).1 1 8
On February 19, 1980, the Senate Commerce Committee went
through an issue outline prepared by staff, and voted on the con-
cepts that it wished to be placed in a proposed committee bill.119
Several major reforms were decided upon at this stage. Although
the committee deleted certain key provisions when presented with
the staff prepared bill reflecting the committee's original re-
forms,120 the final committee bill did contain a number of impor-
tant changes. These included removal of the primary barrier to ob-
taining charter bus authority, placement of certain burdens of
proof on protestants to an application, and authorization of the
PSC to use "zone of reasonableness" rating.'21 The bill was passed
118. Fla. S., Committee on Commerce, tape recording of proceedings (Feb. 18-19, 1980)
(on file with committee). At each of the first four meetings the PSC's suggestions were
presented by Pat Wiggins of the PSC's General Counsel's Office, with additional comments
made by Commissioners Robert Mann, chairman, and Joseph Cresee. See id. (Sept. 10,
1979; Oct. 15, 1979; Jan. 8, 1980; Feb. 18-19, 1980 & March 12, 1980) (on file with the com-
mittee). The findings and recommendations of the Auditor General Report were presented
at the first meeting by its author, Edward Tempest. Id. (Sept. 10, 1979).
119. Id. (Feb. 18-19, 1980).
120. Fla. SB 345 (1980).
121. Regarding the allowance of entry through the granting of a certificate, the commit-
tee originally voted, in concept, to (1) place the burden on a protestant to prove that its
business would be adversely affected, (2) eliminate the requirement that the PSC first deter-
mine that existing service is inadequate prior to granting a certificate (but keeping the need
for service as relevant), (3) provide "general principles" to guide but not bind the PSC in
avoiding unreasonable operating restrictions, and (4) eliminate the requirement that a pas-
senger carrier have regular route authority in order to obtain charter authority. Id. (Voting
"in concept" occurs when the committee has no formal legislation before it, Instead, votes
are taken merely on ideas or "concepts" which the committee endorses). However, when the
committee was presented with the staff prepared bill containing these entry reforms, Fla.
SB 345 (1980), the committee amended the bill to remove the second and third reforms
listed above, but retained the two reforms relating to the burden of proof and charter au-
thority. Fla. S. Committee on Commerce, committee report (March 12, 1980) (on file with
committee). The changes were incorporated into Fla. SB 345 to make Fla. CS for SB 345
(1980).
In regard to rate regulation, the committee retained the original "concept" votes to (1)
authorize the PSC to set minimum and maximum rates for any type of motor carrier and (2)
to expressly authorize the filing of rates by rate bureaus and exempt them from the state
antitrust law. Id. § 12. The committee also added some carriers to the existing list of exemp-
tions, but eliminated one from the list. Id. § 28. The bill eliminated the exemption for intra-
municipal carriage. It added exemptions for the five types of carriers which were permitted
as a matter of right: taxicabs, transportation under contract with the United States govern-
ment, transportation incidental to a person's primary business of repair or installation,
transportation of houses formerly attached to realty and transportation of livestock, seafood
and agricultural products. The bill also added exemptions for transportation of newspapers
which was then exempt only from rate regulation. Additional exemptions were added for
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unanimously by the committee and officially reported out of com-
mittee on March 17, 1980 as Florida Committee Substitute for
Senate Bill 345 (CS for SB 345). 1s2
When CS for SB 345 reached the floor of the Senate on April 9,
1980, the full Senate, "defying all predictions" in the words of one
newspaper report,2 3 passed many amendments to the bill, which
resulted in subjecting the trucking industry to increased competi-
tion. The first surprise to the lobbyists and the media, if not to the
Senate membership, was an amendment offered by nineteen sena-
tors, which completely exempted passenger carriers from PSC reg-
ulation except for the requirement of obtaining a permit from the
PSC, issued "upon a demonstration that the carrier can provide
safe transportation, and that the carrier is fit to operate as a busi-
ness affected with the public interest.11 2 4
The most dramatic moment, however, occurred when an amend-
ment was offered which made the fitness and financial ability of an
applicant the only relevant criteria for the granting of an operating
certificate for all types of motor carriers. The amendment struck
language in the statute relating to the need for the proposed ser-
vice and the effect on existing transportation and, in particular,
struck the language which required a PSC determination of pre-
sent inadequacy of service. The amendment passed by one vote.12 5
The passage of the amendment cleared the way for many others.
Twenty-three other amendments were subsequently adopted. 2 6
Another important amendment prohibited the filing of rates by
rate bureaus and changed the rate regulation procedure from a
"prior approval" to a "use and file" basis.1 27 Another significant
amendment was passed transferring safety jurisdiction from the
PSC to the Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Ve-
transportation of lost or misplaced baggage, drive-away automobiles, car-pools, mass transit,
horse carriers and federally funded social service transportation.
122. Florida Legislature, History of Legislation, 1980 Regular Session, Senate Bill Ac-
tions Report at 100.
123. "Senate Stunner Lifts Regulations on Truck Firms," Florida Times Union, Apr. 10,
1980, at 1, col. 4,
124. See FLA. S. JouR. 85 (Reg. Sess. 1980) (amendments 9, 9A and 10 for Fla. CS for SB
345).
125. See id. (amendment 11 for Fla. CS for SB 345). The amendment was moved by
Senator Kenneth (Buddy) MacKay.
126. FLA. S. JOUR. 84-88 (Reg. Sess. 1980).
127. Id. at 86 (amendment 12 to Fla. CS for SB 345). The "prior approval" rate proce-
dure in ch. 323 required PSC approval (or a passage of time without PSC action) prior to
any rate change. Under the "use and file" amendment, rates could be changed without PSC
approval; however, the PSC could require a rate change at a later date.
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hicles. 12 s CS for SB 345, as amended, was passed by the Senate,
twenty-nine to seven.
129
C. The House of Representatives
While the Senate passed its motor carrier bill, the Florida House
of Representatives was working on its own bill. The Florida House
Regulatory Reform Committee, chaired by Representative George
Sheldon, reviewed the regulation of motor carriers. Under Repre-
sentative Sheldon's direction the committee invited various trans-
portation experts to speak at its early meetings. 130 Five meetings
held by the Regulatory Reform Committee in March and April,
1980, were devoted solely to expert and public testimony on trans-
portation regulation.1 1
128. Id. at 87 (amendments 22-24 to Fla. CS for SB 345).
129. Id. at 88.
130. At its first two meetings on September 20 and 21, 1979, the committee was ad-
dressed by Dr. James Miller I1, co-director for the Study of Government Regulations at the
American Enterprise Institute; Dr. Milton Kafoglis, economics professor at Emory Univer-
sity; Dan Klein, director of planning, Eastern Airlines; and Jack Pearce, transportation
attorney from Washington, D.C. Fla. H.R., Committee on Regulatory Reform, committee
reports (Sept. 20-21, 1979) (on file with committee). "Local" speakers included Ed Tempest
of the Florida Office of the Auditor General, and Ernie Litz of the Department of Public
Administration at Florida State University who prepared for the committee a study of Flor-
ida's regulation of motor carriers which was submitted on July 24, 1979. E. Litz, Florida's
Regulation of Surface Transportation: A Study of Issues (July 24, 1980) (available at the
Fla. H.R. Committee on Regulatory Reform, Tallahassee, Fl.). This report is descriptive in
nature and does not contain conclusions or recommendations. Dr. Miller, Dr. Kafoglis, and
Jack Pearce all strongly advocated substantial reduction of regulation in the trucking indus-
try. Fla. H.R., Committee on Regulatory Reform, tape recording of proceedings (Sept. 20-21,
1979) (on file with committee). The committee was also shown three video tapes examining
the trucking deregulation question. Id.
131. The committee reports of the Florida House of Representatives Committee on
Regulatory Reform reflect testimony from the following persons:
March 17, 1980-Bill Bryant, Chief Antitrust Section, Florida Department of Le-
gal Affairs
Elliott Gerden, Chief, Transportation Section, Antitrust Divi-
sion, United States Department of Justice
Jim Wharton, Attorney representing the Florida Intrastate Rate
Bureau
Mark Brookshire, Chief, Traffic Bureau, Florida Intrastate Rate
Bureau
March 18, 1980-Dan Kaplan, Chief, Policy Analysis Division, Civil Aeronautics
Board
Pat Wiggins, General Counsel's Office, Florida Public Service
Commission
Jack Shreve, Florida Public Counsel
April 7, 1980--29 appearance cards filed by representatives of the trucking indus-
try and shippers who use its services.
Meetings on transportation regulation were also held on April 16 and April 21, 1980 (on file
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A proposed committee bill was prepared by the committee staff
under the direction of chairman George Sheldon."'2 The proposal
was presented to the committee and discussed on April 29, 1980,
amended and adopted on April 30, 1980.111 The proposed commit-
tee bill was officially introduced as Florida House Bill 1635 (HB
1635)"' 4 and referred to the Florida House of Representatives
Committee on Appropriations.3 " HB 1635 was a complete rewrite
of chapter 323, entitled the "Motor Carrier Reform and Safety Act
of 1980." 1"6 The bill provided for the granting of "certificates of
fitness and safety" to any person found by the PSC to be fit, will-
ing and able to provide the service authorized and to comply with
the chapter's safety requirements and any rule promulgated pursu-
ant thereto. 137 The only operating restrictions which could be ad-
ministratively placed on a carrier were those necessary or proper to
insure the vehicle's safe operation and which were consistent with
the transportation policy set forth in the bill."3 8 The bill also pro-
vided for complete deregulation of passenger rates immediately
upon becoming law and of freight rates on January 1, 1982; until
that date, the PSC was required to establish a "zone of reasonable-
ness" rating. 39 Rate bureaus were expressly made subject to the
state antitrust law.140 The PSC's safety jurisdiction was expanded
to cover all commercial vehicles, including those otherwise exempt
from PSC regulation.14 1 Practically all of the exemptions from reg-
ulation added by CS for HB 345 were also exempted in HB 1635;
in addition, HB 1635 exempted vehicles weighing less than 10,000
pounds, unless transporting hazardous materials.14 2 The bill also
provided a $50,000 civil penalty, as well as treble damages, against
motor carriers engaged in certain anticompetitive and discrimina-
with committee).
132. See Proposed Committee Bill relating to ch. 323 (available at Fla. H.R. Committee
on Regulatory Reform, Tallahassee, Fl.).
133. Fla. H.R., Committee on Regulatory Reform, tape recording of proceedings (April
29-30, 1980).
134. Fla. HB 1635 (1980).
135. Florida Legislature, History of Legislation, 1980 Regular Session, House Bill
Actions Report at 369.
136. Fla. HB 1635, § 1 (1980).
137. Id. at 11.
138. Id. at 13-14.
139. Id. at 15-17.
140. Id. at 17.
141. Id. at 18-19.
142. Id.
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tory practices.14 The House Regulatory Reform Committee passed
the bill by a vote of seventeen to one. 44
On May 7, 1980, the Appropriations Committee passed a com-
mittee substitute for HB 1635 (CS for HB 1635), which incorpo-
rated several amendments into the bill. 4 5 One of the amendments
made domicile in Florida a requirement for obtaining an operating
certificate. (In the case of a corporate applicant, domicile simply
meant registration with the Department of State.)' 46 Another
amendment removed the section which provided a $50,000 penalty
and treble damages against carriers engaged in certain anticompe-
titive and discriminatory practices. 147 Otherwise, the committee
substitute was nearly identical to the original bill and contained all
of the reforms previously mentioned.
The House of Representatives acted on CS for HB 1635 on May
8 and 9, 1980.1"1 At this time the House also had available for ac-
tion the Senate's motor carrier bill, CS for SB 345, and had the
option of passing that bill and sending it to the Governor for ap-
proval, or amending it and sending it back to the Senate." 9 How-
ever, the House chose to proceed with CS for HB 1635.1' The
most significant amendment that was adopted on the floor pro-
vided for complete deregulation of all rates on January 1, 1981, one
year previous to the date provided in the original bill. 15' Between
the three month period from July 1 to September 31, 1980, rates
could be raised or lowered as much as fifteen percent without PSC
approval. For the following three months, October 1 to December
31, 1980, rates could be changed an additional fifteen percent with-
out PSC approval.15 2 All of the other previously mentioned reforms
remained intact, and on May 9, the House passed CS for HB 1635
by a vote of ninety to twelve.153
143. Id. at 21-23.
144. Fla. H.R., Committee on Regulatory Reform, committee report (April 30, 1980)
(vote sheet on Fla. HB 1635) (on file with committee).
145. Fla. H.R., Committee on Appropriations, committee report (May 7, 1980) (on file
with committee).
146. Id. (amendment 12 to Fla. HB 1635).
147. Id. (amendment 7 to Fla. HB 1635).
148. Florida Legislature, History of Legislation, 1980 Regular Session, House Bill Ac-
tions Report at 369.
149. Id., Senate Bill Actions Report at 100.
150. Id., House Bill Actions Report at 369.
151. FLA. H.R. JoUR. 368 (Reg. Sess. 1980) (amendment 1 to Fla. CS for HB 1635).
152. Id.
153. Id. at 408.
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D. The Compromise That Never Happened
At the time, it seemed likely that the Senate and House would
come together on a motor carrier bill. Both houses passed major
reform measures which were substantially similar in the important
area of entry, both generally making the fitness of the applicant
the only relevant factor. Additionally, both bills came close to total
deregulation of passenger carriers, and both subjected rate bureaus
to the state antitrust law. However, there were significant differ-
ences in two major areas-rates and safety. While the House pro-
vided for eventual deregulation of rates, the Senate bill maintained
rate regulation on a post-approval basis. Opposing positions were
also taken regarding safety, with the House bill expanding the
PSC's jurisdiction over previously exempted carriers and the Sen-
ate bill transferring safety to the Department of Highway Safety
and Motor Vehicles. There were other differences to be sure, but
these two appeared to be the most important.
Prior to further legislative action on the two Senate and House
bills, Senator Kenneth (Buddy) MacKay held a number of infor-
mal meetings with interested parties in an attempt to arrive at a
compromise satisfactory to both houses."' The staffs of both the
Senate Commerce Committee and the House Regulatory Reform
Committee were present throughout these "negotiations." It was
decided that CS for HB 1635 would be the working model. The
compromise proposal retained the entry requirements in the House
bill, but added a restriction relating to prior convictions of the ap-
plicant. A new rate regulation proposal distinguished between
truckload (TL) rates and less than truckload (LTL) rates, immedi-
ately deregulating the former and phasing out regulation of the
latter.155
154. After CS for HB 1635 was passed by the House, it was sent to the Senate and
referred to the Commerce Committee. Florida Legislature, History of Legislation, 1980 Reg-
ular Session, House Bill Actions Report at 369. About one week later, the Senate formally
requested the return of its bill, CS for SB 345, which was still in the House. Id., Senate Bill
Actions Report at 100. This request was complied with two days later, and CS for SB 345
was returned and also referred to the Commerce Committee. Id.
155. Suggested Amendment to Fla. CS for HB 1635 (available at Fla. S. Committee on
Commerce, Tallahassee, Fl.). The proposal retained the entry provisions of the House bill
by which an applicant had to be "fit, willing, and able" and be domiciled in Florida. Id. at 8.
As in the House bill, domicile for a corporation simply meant registration with Secretary of
State, but the new proposal waived the domicile requirement for an applicant from a state
which had entry requirements more restrictive than Florida's. Id. at 10. A new entry restric-
tion added by the proposal authorized the PSC to deny an application of anyone convicted
of certain crimes within the previous seven years. Id. at 9. A new rate section was written
distinguishing between truckload (TL) rates and less than truckload (LTL) rates. Id. at 13.
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On May 26, 1980, the Senate Commerce Committee considered
CS for HB 1635, and Senator MacKay offered his proposal as an
amendment to the House bill.8 6 At this meeting and the following
meeting on June 2, the Commerce Committee approved the com-
promise proposal, but added further amendments. The rate section
remained intact, but entry and safety provisions were significantly
altered. For entry, the proposal was amended to make the domicile
requirement significantly stronger. While the compromise version
had required a corporate applicant to be registered to do business
in Florida, the amended version required a corporate applicant to
be incorporated in, and have its principal place of business in Flor-
ida. As to safety, the committee voted to transfer the PSC's safety
jurisdiction to the Florida Highway Patrol. Existing PSC investiga-
tors would be transferred to the Department of Transportation to
enforce weight laws. 157
With the exception of one minor amendment, the full Senate
passed the Commerce Committee's amended version of CS for HB
1635 on June 4, 1980, by a unanimous vote of the members pre-
sent.158 An amendment offered by Senators Kenneth Myers and
MacKay to retain safety jurisdiction with the PSC failed by a vote
of eleven to twenty-five.159
The House refused to concur in the Senate amendments and re-
quested the Senate to either recede from their amendments or to
appoint a conference committee. The Senate refused to recede and
a conference committee was appointed on June 5. This was the
TL rates and passenger rates would be deregulated immediately. LTL rates would be de-
regulated after eighteen months, and be allowed to increase 15% during the first six months,
and another 30% during the following twelve months without PSC approval. However, one
important restriction remained for both TL and LTL freight rates: all rate changes had to
be filed with the PSC ten days before they were to become effective and only the rate on file
could be changed. This requirement would continue indefinitely, even though the PSC
would lose its authority to regulate rates. Concerning safety, the proposal expanded the
PSC's jurisdiction to regulate the safety of all motor carriers, except privately owned vehi-
cles carrying the owner's goods. Id. at 7. However, by the time the proposal was offered at
the Senate Commerce Committee, Senator MacKay offered to return the PSC's safety
authority to its existing status, regulating the safety of motor carriers other than those listed
as exempt from all PSC regulation. Fla. S., Committee on Commerce, tape recording of
proceedings (May 26-June 2, 1980) (on file with committee) (discussion by Senator
MacKay).
156. Id. (May 26, 1980).
157. Fla. S., Committee on Commerce, committee reports (May 26 & June 2, 1980) (on
file with committee).
158. Florida Legislature, History of Legislation, 1980 Regular Session, House Bill
Actions Report at 369.
159. FLA. S. JOUR. 666 (Reg. Sess. 1980).
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final action on CS for HB 1635, as the House failed to appoint a
conference committee and, apparently, made the decision to allow
chapter 323 to "sunset" on July 1, 1980.160
Senate President Phillip Lewis and House Speaker Hyatt Brown
called the legislature into special session on June 9, but the call did
not include motor carrier regulation.16 However, on June 10, Gov-
ernor Robert Graham formally advised the legislature that "motor
vehicle safety" was to be included in the special session.162 Senate
Bill 15-D, proposed by Senator Holloway and others, was passed
by both houses on the final day of the special session. " This bill
transferred the PSC's Transportation Enforcement Section, in-
cluding its seventy-two investigators, to the Bureau of Weights
within the Department of Transportation."" The inspectors were
given the authority to enforce weight, load and safety laws.16 Sen-
ate bill 15-D was signed by Governor Graham 66 and became law
on July 1, 1980.167
Probably no one person can fully explain why the Senate and
the House could not reach an agreement on a trucking bill. Clearly,
the failure of the House to respond to the Senate's final amended
version of CS for HB 1635 indicated that the bill was unacceptable
to the majority of its House members and its leadership, and that
complete deregulation was viewed as preferable. One objectionable
provision was believed to be the requirement that carriers indefin-
itely file rates with the PSC, even though rate approval itself was
phased out. Some viewed this as a legal means of "price signaling"
among carriers in addition to being an unnecessary requirement.
The strict residency requirement was also thought to be dis-
favored, although many persons were of the opinion that it would
be declared by the courts to be an unconstitutional burden on
interstate commerce. For whatever reasons, no bill passed reenact-
ing chapter 323, and the Regulatory Reform Act claimed its most
important victim.
160. Florida Legislature, History of Legislation, 1980 Regular Session, House Bill
Actions Report at 369.
161. FLA. S. JOUR. 1 (Spec. Sess. D. June 9, 1980).
162. Id. at 13 (June 10, 1980).
163. Florida Legislature, History of Legislation, 1980 Special Session D, Senate Bill
Actions Report at 3.
164. Fla. SB 15-D.
165. Id. at 3.
166. Florida Legislature, History of Legislation, 1980 Special Session D, Senate Bill
Actions Report at 3.
167. Act of July 1, 1980, ch. 80-298, 1980 Fla. Laws 1312.
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V. STATUTES AND COMMON LAW AFFECTING MOTOR
CARRIERS-POST-SUNSET
Despite the repeal of chapter 323, there are many statutes which
will continue to affect the operations of those individuals and orga-
nizations who transport freight or persons for hire. In the absence
of the PSC, Florida agencies such as the Department of Highway
Safety and Motor Vehicles, Department of Legal Affairs and the
Department of Transportation will be primarily responsible for en-
forcement of these laws. These statutes regulate, albeit less restric-
tively, those areas of operations formerly regulated by the PSC-
entry, rates and safety.
The common law will also play an important role. Prior to chap-
ter 323 the common law governed motor common carriers. s When
chapter 323 was enacted, the common law was modified. The re-
peal of the chapter reinstated the common law.' 9
In Florida, the common law is derived from two sources. Chapter
2.01, Florida Statutes, 170 incorporates into Florida law the common
law of England which was in effect on July 4, 1776.'17 In addition,
the common law includes case law declared by American courts. 2
Since motor carriers were regulated by statute soon after their
coming into commercial prominence, very little common law devel-
oped which was specifically directed to this mode of common car-
rier. However, the law which emerged concerning other common
168. Kennedy v. City of Daytona Beach, 182 So. 228, 229 (Fla. 1938). See, e.g., State ex
rel. Burr v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 106 So. 576, 584 (Fla. 1925).
169. See State v. McLendon, 109 So. 2d 783, 785 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1959). In con-
trast, the repeal of a statutory provision does not reinstate a prior statute. See FLA. STAT.
§ 20.4 (1979).
170. (1979).
171. In 1845, Florida's first legislature directed the Governor of Florida to compile the
English common law in existence on July 4, 1776. The Governor then appointed Leslie A.
Thompson to complete the task. Mr. Thompson identified several provisions one of which
related to carriers: 7 Geo. 2, C. 15 (1734). 1 FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 2 (West 1961). By this
proclamation King George limited the liability of the owner of a ship for damage to goods he
transported. The owner need not pay any amount over the value of the ship and its adorn-
ments, if the loss occurred without the ship owner's knowledge. If the stated value did not
cover the damages of multiple plaintiffs, they were to recover from the value in proportion
to their losses. Multiple owners could intervene to show that they had no knowledge, limit-
ing their liability to the value of the ship. Discovery was authorized to determine the losses.
Id.
The King did not state that the edict exclusively applied to common carriers. However,
the preamble indicates that this was his intent. He noted the increase in the number of
ships and vessels. From this, he reasoned that the statement was necessary to promote the
use of ships by merchants. Thus it appears he anticipated transportation of goods for hire.
172. State v. Egan, 287 So. 2d 1, 6 (Fla. 1973).
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carriers is applicable in large part by analogy and must be consid-
ered as the source of legal principles controlling common carriers
in Florida today.
Early English law defined a "common carrier" as "any man un-
dertaking for hire to carry the goods of all persons indifferently. 1 7 3
The Florida Supreme Court addressed the common law responsi-
bilities of common carriers and embraced the English definition.17 '
The United States Supreme Court summed up the definition by
stating that "the principles of the common law applicable to com-
mon carriers, . . . demanded little more than that they should
carry for all persons who applied, . . . and that their charges for
transportation should be reasonable." ' Thus, at common law a
common carrier is one who indiscriminately provides its services
and reasonably charges for the accomodation. This definition is the
basis for determining which motor carriers will be subject to the
requirements of common law. Like certain remaining Florida stat-
utes, the common law will also serve to "regulate" the entry, rates
and safety of motor carriers.
A. Entry
Anyone desiring to enter the business of intrastate motor carrier
transportation will find few Florida laws standing in his way, other
than those generally applicable to every prospective driver and
vehicle owner. Obviously, a driver must have a valid license, issued
by the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles upon
examination; however, any person operating a truck with a gross
weight in excess of 8,000 pounds or in excess of 80 inches in width,
or operating a vehicle transporting persons for hire is required to
obtain a chauffeur's license.117
No separate statutory insurance requirements exist expressly for
motor carriers; therefore, the insurance requirements applicable to
all vehicle owners also apply to motor carriers. Every owner or reg-
istrant of a motor vehicle must have an insurance policy, or other
173. Gisbourn v. Hurst, 91 Eng. Rep. 220 (K.B. 1710) (cited in No. 177 ENGLISH REPORTS
INDEX TO CASES 648 (1932)). This definition is landmark in forming the basis of the duty of
common carriers to serve patrons without discrimination. Y. SMITH, N. DOWLING & R. HALE,
CASES ON PUBLIC UTILITIES 4 n.21 (2d ed. 1936).
174. Bennett v. Filyaw, 1 Fla. 403, 405 (1847). The court stated: "A common carrier in
law has been defined to be one who undertakes for hire or reward to transport the goods of
such as chose to employ him from place to place, as a business and not as a casual occupa-
tion pro hac vice." (emphasis in original).
175. Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Baltimore & 0. R. R., 145 U.S. 263, 275 (1892).
176. FLA. STAT. § 322.03 (1979).
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approved method of security, which provides "personal injury pro-
tection" (PIP) benefits.177 In addition to these requirements, liabil-
ity requirements are also imposed, but only upon persons involved
in an accident in which property damage exceeds $500 or in which
bodily injury occurs, and upon persons convicted of certain traffic
violations. 178 These requirements differ from those imposed by the
PSC upon certified carriers. In order to show proof of financial
ability to respond for damages in future accidents, vehicle opera-
tors must obtain liability insurance, or other approved forms of se-
curity, in the amount of $10,000 for bodily injury or death to any
one person, $20,000 for bodily injury or death to two or more per-
sons in any one accident, and $5,000 for damage to physical prop-
erty. 179 The PSC by rule had required $100,000/$300,000/$50,000
liability coverage for most carriers, and $2,500/$5,000 cargo
insurance. 80
A motor carrier is apparently now required, for the first time, to
obtain an inspection sticker. Every registered motor vehicle must
obtain a safety equipment inspection from the Department of
Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles annually.' 8 ' The statutes cur-
rently provide an exemption from this requirement for vehicles op-
erating under a certificate issued by the PSC;8's the exemption is
presumably no longer effective.
The above requirements of a license, insurance, and a safety in-
spection appear to be the only Florida statutes an entering motor
carrier must satisfy to begin operating unless the business is to be
incorporated, in which case it could be subject to the provisions of
the Florida General Corporation Act. 88
177. Florida Automobile Reparations Reform Act, FLA. STAT. §§ 627.733, .736 (1979).
The required coverage must be at least $10,000. This coverage provides payment of medical
and disability benefits to the named insured, household relatives, persons operating the ve-
hicle, passengers in the vehicle, and persons struck by the vehicle if not an occupant of a
vehicle. Id. PIP coverage provides payment of 80% of medical expenses and 80% of income
loss. Id. § 627.736. Unless a person suffers a certain "significant and permanent" injury, that
person is prohibited from recovering damages for bodily injury in tort. Id. § 627.737.
178. Id. 88 324.011, .051.
179. Id. 88 324.021-.031.
180. FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 25-5.31.
181. FLA. STAT. § 325.12 (1979). The statute requires that the following equipment be
determined to be in safe operating condition: brakes, lights, horn, steering mechanism,
windshield wipers, directional signals, tires, and exhaust system. Id. § 325.19.
182. Id. § 325.28.
183. Id. ch. 607 (1979). In regard to corporate formation, the act requires certain infor-
mation to be contained in the articles of incorporation which must be filed with the Florida
Department of State. The required information relates to the name, duration and purpose
of the corporation; number, class and par value of shares; rights of shareholders; and the
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Once a carrier begins operations, however, additional statutes
will affect its methods of operation. Of particular importance to
the motor carrier industry is the Documents of Title Act'" of the
Uniform Commercial Code which applies to bills of lading issued
by private as well as common carriers.1es Generally, part III of
chapter 677 addresses the issuance of bills of lading and liability
associated with them,186 the delivery of goods under a bill of lading
and liability for breaches of those contracts,'8 and the creation of
a carrier's lien on the goods and its enforcement.188 Also, part III
specifically mentions common carriers by spelling out the require-
ments of loading the goods when the issuer of the bill is a common
carrier. 1 98 Further, this part does not supercede any rule of law im-
posing liability on the common carrier for damages not caused by
its negligence."90 Thus, the common carrier's liability for damage to
goods under its control remains that of an insurer."" Part IV speci-
fies general obligations for goods under bills of lading and ware-
house receipts which relate primarily to delivery."9 Part V outlines
generally the requirements for negotiations and transfer of negoti-
able documents of title.19 3
Also affecting a carrier's method of operation is the Deceptive
and Unfair Trade Practices Act.'" The act declares unlawful any
names and addresses of the agent, directors and incorporators. Id. § 607.164.
184. Id. ch. 677.
185. 20 FLA. Jun. 2d Documents of Title § 17 (1980). A bill of lading is defined by the
act as "a document evidencing the receipt of goods for shipment by a person engaged in the
business of transporting or forwarding goods." FLA. STAT. § 671.201(6) (1979).
186. See FLA. STAT. §§ 677.301-.302, .304-.306 (1979).
187. See id. §§ 677.303, .307.
188. See id. §§ 677.307-.309.
189. See id. § 677.301(2)-(3). Specifically, if the common carrier is the issuer and loads
the freight, he must count the packages or determine the kind and quantity of bulk freight.
Id. § 677.301(2). When the issuer is a common carrier but the items are loaded by the ship-
per who has available adequate facilities for weighing, the common carrier has a reasonable
time after the loading to make the determination of the kind and quantity of the shipment.
Id. § 677.301(3).
190. See id. § 677.309(1).
191. Gulf Coast Transp. Co. v. Howell, 70 Fla. 544, 551 (1915).
192. See FLA. STAT. § 677.403 (1979). A holder of the goods must tender the goods to the
person holding the document after the payment of the charges and expenses, and, if the
document is negotiable, after also surrendering the document, and it is cancelled. Id. A
holder of goods who delivers them in good faith is released from liability for wrongful deliv-
ery. Id. § 677.404.
193. Id. §§ 677.101-.105. Part I sets out definitions and construction aids for the Act. Id.
§§ 677.101-.105. Part II relates to warehouse receipts which are not of particular importance
to the carrier. Id. §§ 377.201-.210.
194. Id. §§ 501.201-.213.
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unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.9 5 The Depart-
ment of Legal Affairs has adopted rules specifying prohibited prac-
tices 96 which are required to be consistent with the rules and deci-
sions of the Federal Trade Commission 97 interpreting the Federal
Trade Commission Act.' 8 Both state enforcement and private
rights of action are authorized. "9
The actions of "common carriers," although not specifically
motor common carriers, are affected by statutes which in practice
have been assumed to apply only to railroads.2 00 However, the
Florida courts in several instances have applied provisions of these
chapters to motor carriers.
In a well reasoned opinion, Seaboard Air Line Railway v.
Simon,20' the Florida Supreme Court upheld an equal protection
challenge to the forerunner of section 353.01, Florida Statutes.2 2
As originally written the law applied solely to railroads and stated
the procedure for claims for lost or damaged freight.2 0 3 The court
summarized the guarantee of equal protection:
An unreasonable classification of persons or corporations for
the purposes of a legislative regulation that will be burdensome to
those included in the class regulated, leaving others who are simi-
larly conditioned with reference to the subject regulated free from
the regulation and burden, may be an arbitrary exercise of gov-
ernmental power.1 4
From there the court reasoned that the subject of the section was
equally applicable to all common carriers.20 5 The justifications of-
fered for the classification were not sufficient, i.e., the more fre-
195. Id. § 501.204.
196. See FLA. ADMIN. CODE Rs. 2-7.01-23.12.
197. FLA. STAT. § 501.205(2) (1979).
198. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1976).
199. FLA. STAT. §§ 501.207, 211 (1979).
200. Chapters 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, and 358 all contain sections which by their terms
apply to "common carriers." In 1980, the legislature designated part of ch. 351 and all of
chs. 352-360 for repeal on July 1, 1982 after a review is completed on those chapters. Act of
July 1, 1980, ch. 80-289, 1980 Fla. Laws 1224.
201. 47 So. 1001 (Fla. 1908).
202. (1979).
203. See Act of June 1, 1905, ch. 5424, 1905 Fla. Laws 104. The current version at FLA.
STAT. § 353.01 (1979) pertains to common carriers and retains the procedure controlling
claims.
204. 47 So. at 1002.
205. Id. at 1002-03.
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quent use of railroads than other common carriers at that time; the
absence of competition from other carriers; and the amount of bus-
iness transacted by the railroads.2 6 However, the court expressed
saving language only for provisions peculiar to railroads.20 There-
fore, those sections which address the general duty of a common
carrier must be applied to all types of common carriers as a
class.208
In fact, the Third District Court of Appeal in Ipec, Inc. v. Inter-
national Printing Machine Corp.20 9 has applied sections 355.01,
.03 and .09, Florida Statutes2 0 in favor of an intrastate motor car-
rier. These sections establish a statutory lien for common carri-
ers, provide for the sale of the encumbered goods,21' and grant
immunity to a carrier for claims of conversion after the sale of the
goods if the provisions of the chapter are met."3 Following the
logic of Simon, chapter 355 in its entirety should be construed in
favor of all common carriers as a class. At issue in Ipec was a stat-
utory sale of nonperishable goods under lien." Generally, the
other sectins in the chapter address the sale of perishable property
under lien.215 No apparent, logical or legal difference exists be-
tween the two kinds of property sufficient to justify a difference in
application.
Finally, section 358.11, Florida Statutes,"l6 was amended in 1979,
deleting references to railroads and replacing them with "common
carrier. ' '"1 7 Consistently, all of chapter 358 refers to common car-
riers. The subject of the chapter is the ticketing of passengers on
206. Id.
207. Id. at 1003-04.
208. See generally FLA. STAT. §§ 352.19-.21 (1979) (relating to discrimination in rates);
id. § .26-.27 (relating to delivery or freight); id. § .33-.36 (relating to transportation of live-
stock); id. ch. 353 (relating to claims for lost or damaged freight); id. ch. 354 (relating to
special officers for the protection and safety of carrier's); id. ch. 355 (relating to a carriers
lien); id. ch. 358 (relating to tickets on carriers).
209. 251 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1971).
210. (1979).
211. FLA. STAT. § 355.01 (1979).
212. Id. § 355.03.
213. Id. § 355.09.
214. 251 So. 2d 911, 913.
215. Chapter 355 contains the following sections not construed in Ipec: FLA. STAT.
§§ 355.06-.07 (1979) (relating to the sale of perishable property other than livestock); id.
§§ 355.04-.05 (relating to the sale of livestock); id. § 355.08 (relating to the bidding proce-
dure for the sales); id. § 355.02 (relating to the procedure prior to sale of nonperishable
property).
216. (1979).
217. Act of June 19, 1979, ch. 79-191, 1979 Fla. Laws 822.
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common carriers. 18 Since most common carriers of persons use
tickets or their facsimile, under Simon, it is logical to assume that
chapter 358 should apply to all common carriers including motor
carriers.
Common law should have the least effect on entry, per se, be-
cause entry into the marketplace was not restricted by the com-
mon law.2 9 Without the statutory barrier to entry, the oligopolistic
nature of the market is relaxed. Theoretically, the market becomes
a free system under which the common carrier will act indepen-
dently. However, the common carrier must comply with several
duties imposed by common law.
Foremost is the duty to serve the public indiscriminately. In
Johnson v. Pensacola & Perdido Railroad,220 the court set out the
duty: "[Als against a common or public carrier, every person has
the same right; that is all cases, where his common duty controls,
he cannot refuse A and accomodate B; . ... "21 No contract can
relieve a carrier of this duty,2 22 and it may be enforced by
mandamus.22
As part of this duty, a common carrier is required to transport
those goods and passengers which are offered and accepted for car-
riage.2 24 Passenger status begins when a person offers and is ac-
cepted for travel by the carrier2 8 and continues until the passenger
leaves the carrier or performs an act which causes the relationship
to terminate.2 6 Incident to the duty to transport passengers is the
duty to carry their baggage.227 For the protection of this type of
goods (indeed for all transported freight) a carrier of goods is held
to the duty of an insurer of the goods.228 However, liability does
218. See FLA. STAT. ch. 358 (1979).
219. Jones, Origins of the Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity: Develop-
ments in the States, 1870-1920, 79 CoL. L. REv. 426, 429 (1979).
220. 16 Fla. 623 (1878).
221. Id. at 667.
222. State ex rel. Burr v. Jacksonville Term. Co., 106 So. 576, 584 (Fla. 1925).
223. See State v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 40 So. 875, 881 (Fla. 1906).
224. See, e.g., Orlando Transit Co. v. Florida R.R. & Public Utils. Comm'n, 37 So. 2d
321, 327-28 (Fla. 1948).
225. Swilley v. Economy Cab Co., 46 So. 2d 173, 176 (Fla. 1950).
226. Henderson v. Tarver, 123 So. 2d 369, 371 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1960).
227. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Campen Bros. Co., 154 So. 131, 133 (Fla. 1934). Baggage
includes articles necessary for personal comfort. Id. at 132. A carrier is entitled to know the
contents of the carriage. Id. at 133.
228. See Gulf Coast Transp. Co. v. Howell, 70 So. 567, 569 (Fla. 1915) (for the carriage
of goods); Rudisil v. Taxicabs of Tampa, Inc., 147 So. 2d 180, 182 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1962) (for the carriage of baggage). However, if the items carried by the passenger are not
personal, the liability is only that of bailee. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Campen Bros. Co.,
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not attach until the items are in the control of the carrier.2 9 More-
over, the goods must be delivered in a reasonable time2 0 and ac-
cording to the shipper's order.2 81 Excuses for delay are however al-
lowed.2"2 If the customer does not pay the carrier charges, there is
a common law lien on the goods for those charges23 3 which attaches
as soon as the charges are due and remains as long as the carrier
has possession of the goods.2" To aid the common carrier in meet-
ing these duties, it is bound to provide adequate facilities for
carriage.ss
B. Rates
For the first time in half a century, motor carriers will not be
required to seek the approval of the PSC prior to a rate change.
However, there is at least one important state law of which motor
carriers must be apprised, the state antitrust law.2" Florida's anti-
trust law had remained basically unchanged since 1915.87 Until
154 So. 131, 133 (Fla. 1934).
229. See Wilson & Toomer Fertilizer v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 136 So. 339, 341 (Fla.
1931) (for the carriage of goods); Rudisil v. Taxicabs of Tampa, Inc., 147 So. 2d 180, 182
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1962) (for the carriage of persons). Liability for the carriage of goods
relates back to old English common law. In Bastard v. Bastard, 89 Eng. Rpts. 81 (K.B. 1680)
(cited in No. 177 ENGLISH REPORTS INDEX To CASES 119 (1932)), King Charles stated: "A
common carrier is liable for the loss of goods delivered to him to carry .. " Id.
230. Florida East Coast Ry. v. Peters, 73 So. 151, 161 (Fla. 1916).
231. In North Pa. R.R. v. Commercial Bank of Chicago, 123 U.S. 727, 733-34 (1887), the
United States Supreme Court stated: "The duty of a common carrier is not merely to carry
safely the goods intrusted to him, but also to deliver them to the party designated by the
terms of shipment, or to his order, at the place of destination."
For passenger carriers, the Florida Second District Court of Appeal succinctly stated the
rule: "It is (a) well established rule of law that once the relationship of carrier and passenger
is established, it will not ordinarily terminate until the passenger has safely alighted at his
destination." Henderson v. Tarver, 123 So. 2d 369, 371 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1960).
232. Pennsylvania R.R. v. Greco, 25 So. 2d 809, 811 (Fla. 1946). The excuses include an
act of God, of a public enemy, of a shipper, and of a public authority. However, if the delay
can be anticipated, excuse is allowed only if notice is given to the shipper. Id.
233. Wabash R.R. v. Pearce, 192 U.S. 179, 187 (1903). "It is unnecessary to cite authori-
ties to the proposition that it is the common law duty of the carrier to receive, carry and
deliver goods; that by virtue of this obligation it is entitled to retain possession until its
charges are paid." Id.
234. Id.
235. See Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Florida Fine Fruit Co., 112 So. 66, 69 (Fla. 1927);
State v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 50 So. 425, 427 (Fla. 1909). See also Burdick, The Origin of
the Peculiar Duties of Public Service Companies, 11 COL. L. Rav. 514, 515 (1911).
236. FLA. STAT. ch. 542 (1979), as amended by Florida Antitrust Act of 1980, ch. 80-28,
1980 Fla. Laws 86.
237. Memorandum from Jerome Hoffman, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Divi-
sion, Florida Department of Legal Affairs, to Ken Tucker, Deputy Attorney General of
Florida (Feb. 26, 1979).
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the 1980 legislative session, the law had no provision for the right
of private action, and provided only one method of enforcement by
the state attorney general. The exclusive public remedy was corpo-
rate dissolution for domestic firms and revocation of licenses to do
business for a foreign firm. A revised antitrust law effective Octo-
ber 1, 1980, more stringently prohibits combinations in restraint of
trade. For the first time, Florida law prohibits unilateral attempts
to monopolize any part of a trade.2 8s Individuals are subject to a
civil penalty of up to $100,000 and corporations can be fined up to
$1,000,000. The attorney general or a state attorney with written
permission from the attorney general is authorized to recover
treble damages on behalf of Florida citizens injured by a violation
of the act. Broad investigative powers are granted the attorney
general prior to filing a formal complaint.2 39 Of particular impor-
tance to motor carriers, the legislature appropriated $100,000 to
the Department of Legal Affairs and the Office of the Attorney
General specifically earmarked for "legal services associated with
litigation resulting from trucking deregulation. ' '240
At common law, charges assessed by common carriers are limited
only by the bounds of reasonableness. In the landmark case of
Johnson v. Pensacola & Perdido Railroad2 4 1 the Florida Supreme
Court announced the rule: "[T]he entire public, have the right to
the same carriage for a reasonable price, and at a reasonable
charge for the service performed . ". .. , However, the prices
charged are merely matters of evidence. They cannot be used as a
measure of damage unless the lesser charge is established as the
reasonable charge considering the value of the services .24 3 The rea-
son for this rule is to protect the public from extortion. 4
Reasonable does not mean equal. According to the Johnson
court, the rule is that the common carrier must charge the same
rate for identical kinds of service under identical conditions. But it
need not charge an equal amount for the same kind of freight
transported at the same time without more circumstances showing
unreasonableness.2 45 The court reached this conclusion by review-
238. Ch. 80-28, § 1, 1980 Fla. Laws 86.
239. Id.
240. Act of July 10, 1980, ch. 80-411, § 1, 1980 Fla. Laws 1674.
241. 16 Fla. 623, 667 (1878).
242. Id. (emphasis in original).
243. Id.
244. Id. at 668.
245. Id. at 672.
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ing the English and American common law.2 46 To embrace an
equality rule would force a shipper, trying to show the unreason-
ableness of a charge, to find another shipper who merely received a
lesser charge. A competitor may operate under different circum-
stances. The considerations of fairness which reasonableness con-
notes would permit differing costs to generate different prices.2 7
To remedy an unreasonably excessive charge, the aggrieved
party may bring an action for money "had and received." The
cause may be brought "for money paid by mistake or upon consid-
eration which has failed, or for money obtained through imposi-
tion, express or implied, or extortion or oppression, or an undue
advantage taken of the plaintiff's situation, contrary to laws made
for the protection of persons under these circumstances. "248
Other common law rights and duties exist for common carriers
of property and persons. For carriers of property, a right exists to
demand prepayment' 4 9 For common carriers engaged in the trans-
portation of people, a carrier may require payment on demand s'2
but a passenger must use a ticket before the expiration date or
forfeit any refund unless a contract specifies to the contrary. 1
C. Safety
When it became clear that the repeal of chapter 323 was immi-
nent the 1980 legislature provided for a transfer of the Transporta-
tion Enforcement Section of the PSC to the Department of Trans-
portation.' 5 ' The personnel were assigned to the Department's
Bureau of Weights within the Division of Road Operations.25 3 For-
mer PSC safety investigators, now weight inspection officers, are
authorized "to enforce any rules relating to safety adopted by the
Florida Highway Patrol."3 " The law authorizes the Division of
Florida Highway Patrol to adopt rules necessary to implement the
provisions of the Florida Uniform Traffic Control Law.255 This
246. Id. at 660-67.
247. Id. at 668. To the contrary, other jurisdictions support an equality approach. See
generally McCurdy, The Power of a Public Utility to Fix its Rates and Charges in the
Absence of Regulatory Legislation, 38 HARv. L. REv. 202, 206 (1924).
248. Cullen v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 58 So. 182, 184 (Fla. 1912).
249. Wadley S. Ry. v. Georgia, 235 U.S. 651, 656 (1915).
250. See United Rys. & Elec. Co. v. Hardesty, 51 A. 406, 410 (Md. 1902).
251. See Trezona v. Chicago G.W. Ry., 77 N.W. 486, 488 (Iowa 1898).
252. Act of July 1, 1980, ch. 80-298, 1980 Fla. Laws 1312.
253. Id.
254. Id. § 1.
255. Id. § 4.
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rulemaking authority expires on July 1, 1982.256 Chapter 316 con-
tains the state's traffic laws, including prohibited acts (speeding,
reckless driving, etc.)2 6 7 as well as required equipment, weight and
load laws.25 Although not as extensive as the federal safety laws
which had been incorporated by reference by PSC rules,8 9 chapter
316 is a fairly comprehensive set of regulations which should pro-
vide significant protections. The chapter is supplemented by chap-
ter 325, Florida Statutes,' 0 which includes the safety inspection
laws that are now applicable to previously certified motor
carriers. 61
Other Florida statutes related to transportation safety include
section 501.075, Florida Statutes,6 2 which prohibits various acts
relating to the handling of hazardous substances; sections 633.01
and .05, Florida Statutes,20 authorizing the State Fire Marshal to
promulgate and enforce rules relating to transportation of combus-
tibles; and section 381.512, Florida Statutes," ' authorizing the De-
partment of Health and Rehabilitative Services to adopt rules re-
lating to transportation of radioactive materials.
At common law, an element of a common carrier's duty to trans-
port by adequate facilities includes the duty to deliver the carriage
safely whether the cargo is goods or persons.6 In fact, a carrier of
goods is an insurer of the property it transports.2 e On the other
hand, a carrier of persons is not required to insure the safety of its
passengers.2 7 Yet it must meet the highest degree of care for per-
sons in their control 6s and consider the physical and mental condi-
256. Id. § 5.
257. FLA. STAT. §§ 316.007-.209 (1979).
258. Id. §§ 316.2095-.560.
259. FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 25-5.110 (adopting 49 C.F.R. §§ 390-97 (1975) (with
exceptions)).
260. (1979).
261. FLA. STAT. §§ 325.11-.33 (1979).
262. (1979).
263. (1979).
264. (1979).
265. See North Pa. R.R. v. Commercial Bank of Chicago, 123 U.S. 727, 733-34 (1887)
("duty of the common carrier is not merely to carry safely the goods intrusted to him, but
also to deliver them." (emphasis added)); Florida Ry. v. Dorsey, 52 So. 963, 966 (Fla. 1910)
(for the carriage of persons).
266. Gulf Coast Transp. Co. v. Howell, 70 So. 567, 569 (Fla. 1915).
267. Swilley v. Economy Cab Co., 46 So. 2d 173, 177 (Fla. 1950).
268. Id. A degree or duty of care should not be confused with a degree of negligence.
The duty of care is merely an element in the negligence cause of action. W. PRossE., HAND-
BOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30 (4th ed. 1971). In contrast, a degree of negligence is a type
of negligence itself. See id. § 34. This distinction is crucial in Florida and other comparative
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tion of each passenger.2 6 9 To remedy a breach of this duty of safe
transportation, a passenger may sue in contract or in tort.1 0
Thus, the repeal of chapter 323 did not leave the motor common
carrier "unregulated." A carrier must continue to meet the existing
statutory demands and common law duties affecting the previously
regulated functions - entry, rates and safety.
D. Local Regulation
An important yet unresolved question exists concerning the
negligence jurisdictions, because the comparative approach abolished any need for degrees
of negligence. In Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431, 435 (Fla. 1973), the degrees of negligence
were established to mitigate the harshness of the contributory negligence scheme. W. PRos-
SER § 67. After the contributory approach was abolished and the comparative approach was
adopted, the usefulness of the degrees of negligence was negated.
However, the degrees of care remain as exemplified by a post Hoffman case, Transit Cas.
Co. v. Puchalski, 382 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980). In Transit, the court set out
the rule: "While a carrier is not an insurer of the safety of its passengers, a common carrier
is expected to exercise the highest degree of care . I..." Id  at 360.
269. Edwards v. Jacksonville Coach Co., 88 So. 2d 543, 545 (Fla. 1956) (citing Tampa
Elec. Co. v. Fleischaker, 12 So. 2d 901, 902 (1943)). Edwards reversed a lower court's dismis-
sal of a negligence claim. Id. at 545. The plaintiff, an infirmed, aged and corpulent women
with her arm in a cast, was injured when she fell from defendant's bus. The fail was alleg-
edly caused when the door through which she was ordered to exit slammed and caught her
dress, causing her to miss her step. With her disability, she was unable to hold the door
open and step down at the same time. Id. at 544. The court recited the heightened duty of
care and stated: "At a time when she needed help she seems to have met hinderance." Id. at
545.
In Swilley v. Economy Cab. Co, 46 So. 2d 173 (Fla. 1950), on the other hand, the court
drew a distinction between two counts at issue and did not find the high degree of care in
the first count but did find it in the second. 46 So. 2d at 177. The plaintiff had been ac-
cepted as a taxicab passenger while he 'was obviously and apparently drunk and intoxicated
to the point of being physically and mentally irresponsible and incapable.' Id. at 175. The
cab subsequently had a flat tire and the driver stopped to repair it. Id. The plaintiff was
injured when he left the defendant's taxicab and was struck by an oncoming car. The first
count merely alleged that when the cab stopped, the plaintiff left the cab and placed himself
in the precarious position which resulted in his injury. Id. at 175-76. The court stated that
the duty of care did not impose superhuman powers. To have held the company liable
would have made it an absolute insurer of conditions beyond its control. Id. at 177. This
stringent standard is not an element of the duty to transport passengers safely. Id. On the
other hand, the second count alleged that the plaintiff did not alight until his offer of aid to
the driver was accepted. The court used this factual distinction to find that the second
count might support a cause of action. Id. at 177-78.
270. Herdia v. Safeway Trails, Inc., 369 So. 2d 418, 420 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
Here the plaintiff, a passenger on defendant's bus, was permanently injured when the bus
ran into a canal. By the time the action was filed, the statute of limitations had run for a
tort cause and for any action on the breach of an oral contract. However, time remained for
an action on a written contract. Id. at 419-20. The court reversed the dismissal by the lower
court, recognizing that the plaintiff was traveling on the basis of a written contract, the
ticket. Id. at 420.
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degree of regulation local governments will not be permitted to
impose on motor carriers. Article VIII, section 2 of the Florida
Constitution authorizes municipalities to exercise any power for
municipal services except as otherwise provided by law.17 1 In recog-
nition of this provision, the legislature in 1973 implemented a
broad grant of power to municipalities by enacting the Municipal
Home Rule Powers Act.27 2 The act authorizes each municipality
"to enact legislation concerning any subject matter upon which the
state legislature may act," with certain exceptions.27
Chapter 323 expressly stated that PSC regulation of motor carri-
ers prevailed in the case of conflict between its regulation and the
provisions of any city or county ordinance.2 "' However, recognizing
that motor carriers operating wholly within a muncipality and its
suburban territory were exempt from PSC regulation, the statutes
expressly stated that nothing in the chapter should be construed to
limit the power of any municipality to license, control and regulate
such carriers.21 While chapter 323 had preserved the power of a
municipality to regulate carriers which operated exclusively within
the municipality, the repeal of the chapter raises the question of
whether municipalities will now be authorized to regulate the in-
tramunicipal operations of an otherwise intermunicipal carrier. In
particular, it can now be argued that a city will be permitted to
determine which carriers will be permitted to pick up or deliver
shipments within the city, and be able to set the rates for an in-
tramunicipal shipment of a carrier which also transports to other
areas of the state.
Certain Florida statutes may be examined to determine the ju-
risdictional extent of a municipality's regulatory power. Section
205.042, Florida Statutes27 6 enumerates those persons upon whom
a municipality may levy an occupational license tax for the privi-
lege of engaging in any business within its jurisdiction including
271. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 2(b) reads as follows: "Municipalities shall have governmen-
tal, corporate and proprietary powers to enable them to conduct municipal government,
perform municipal functions and render municipal services, and may exercise any power for
municipal purposes except as otherwise provided by law. Each municipal legislative body
shall be elective."
272. Ch. 73-129, 1973 Fla. Laws 238 (current version at FLA. STAT. ch. 166 (1979)).
273. FLA. STAT. § 166.021(3) (1979). The exceptions include those subjects preempted to
the local governments or prohibited by the Florida Constitution. Also excepted are laws
relating to the geographical size of the local unit. Id.
274. Id. § 323.07 (1979) (repealed 1980).
275. Id. § 323.054 (1979) (repealed 1980).
276. (1979).
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any person who maintains a permanent business location or branch
office within the municipality 27 and any person who engages in in-
terstate commerce unless preempted by the enumerated powers
clause of the United States Constitution. 27 8 A recent opinion of the
Florida Attorney General interpreted the meaning of the latter sit-
uation and states that it is not sufficient to find interstate business
elsewhere in order for the municipality to levy an occupational tax.
Rather the business must be engaged in interstate commerce
within the jurisdiction of the city in order for it to fall within the
taxing power of the city under section 205.042(3).27" Following the
logic of this opinion, in the absence of a permanent business loca-
tion or branch office, a municipality would be without the author-
ity to levy an occupational license tax on most motor carriers.
However, a separate statutory section within the Municipal Home
Rule Powers Act authorizes a municipality to levy reasonable regu-
latory fees: "A municipality may levy reasonable business, profes-
sional, and occupational regulatory fees, commensurate with the
cost of the regulatory activity, including consumer protection, on
such classes of businesses, professions and occupations, the regula-
tion of which has not been preempted by the state or a county
pursuant to a county charter. ' '280 The Attorney General has stated
that a regulatory license fee imposed under this section does not
fall within the purview of chapter 205 and the municipality may
levy the regulatory fee on a person who does not maintain a per-
manent business location or branch office within the municipality.
Whether the license fee meets the requirements necessary to be
considered a regulatory fee, according to this opinion, is an issue of
fact to be determined by the judiciary. 8'
In any event, the Municipal Home Rule Powers Act is a broad
277. Id. § 205.042(1)-(2).
278. Id. § 205.042(3).
279. 78-120 Op. ATr'v GEN. 296, 297 (October 11, 1978). The opinion summarized its
findings as follows:
A business that publishes and prints television guides outside a taxing munici-
pality's jurisdiction and distributes such publications to hotels within the munici-
pality and throughout Florida, and whose sales representatives solicit advertising
within the taxing municipality which is run in television guides subsequently pub-
lished and delivered to hotels within the municipality from which the guides are
distributed by such hotels to their guests and others, is not, in the absence of
engaging in separable and distinct local activities or incidents other than the solic-
itation and the delivery, or in the absence of a permanent business location, liable
to the occupational license tax provided for in s. 205.042(3), F. S.
280. FLA. STAT. § 166.221 (1979).
281. 76-30 Op. Arr'v GEN. 52 (Jan. 30, 1976).
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grant of authority to local governments that has been liberally con-
strued.282 The question of municipal regulation of motor carriers
will primarily depend upon the jurisdictional extent of municipal
authority rather than the state's preemption or statutory prohibi-
tion due to the absence of the latter.
Similarly, counties operating under charters are constitutionally
guaranteed all powers of local self-government, consistent with
general law.283 Noncharter counties, however, only have such pow-
ers of self government provided by general or special law."" Like
municipalities, charter counties may now have an opportunity to
regulate certain aspects of motor carriers operating within its
boundaries.
Regulation of motor carriers by local governments is not likely to
restrict the marketplace to such a degree as state regulation. In
fact, there is no present indication that local governments plan to
implement significant regulation of motor carriers in general. How-
ever, the legal avenue appears to be open for such regulation, al-
though the extent of regulatory authority is an unresolved
question.
VI. CONCLUSION
Literally overnight, Florida intrastate trucking has gone from
being an extremely restricted industry to the least regulated in the
country. Due to a stalemate between the Florida Senate and House
of Representatives, the provisions of the Regulatory Reform Act
repealed the laws that had regulated motor carriers for fifty years.
Although statutory and common law will continue to affect mo-
tor carriers, the carriers are now largely free to make independent
economic decisions concerning the method and scope of their oper-
ations. Safety remains the most significant regulation. Due to the
law passed at the close of the 1980 session, transferring PSC inves-
tigators to the Department of Transportation, little has been lost
in manpower for safety enforcement, although the broad rulemak-
ing authority formerly provided to the PSC has been repealed.
Concerning rates, the most potentially important statute is the
newly revised state antitrust law. The actual impact of this act on
282. See, e.g., City of Miami Beach v. Forte Towers, Inc., 305 So. 2d 764 (Fla. 1974); City
of Temple Terrace v Hillsborough Assoc. for Retarded Citizens, Inc., 322 So. 2d 571 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
283. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § (l)(g).
284. Id. § l(f).
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motor carrier rates remains to be seen, but the bureau method of
rate setting which has long been an aspect of the motor carrier
industry is now of questionable legality. The most unregulated as-
pects of the motor carrier industry will be entry and individual
carriers' scope of operations. Minimal legal barriers will exist to
transporting persons or goods for hire, and a carrier will be able to
make independent judgments on the areas it wishes to serve. Al-
though various common law duties arise once service is provided,
the initial decision to provide the service is now unfettered.
It is too soon to judge the merits and disadvantages of deregula-
tion.285 It appears likely that large cities will experience the bene-
fits of competition in terms of increased service and lower rates
due to the attractive market in such areas. Undoubtedly, certain
small communities will face a reduction in service or increased
rates. The one group of persons who are certain to benefit are
those individuals who want to enter the motor carrier industry.
The results of motor carrier deregulation in Florida will greatly
influence regulatory reform, or the lack of it, in other states. Al-
though many people disagree over the wisdom of deregulation in
Florida, few argue about its importance2 s
285. Statistics that are available on the two largest bus companies operating in Florida
present an interesting comparison. Greyhound, the largest passenger carrier, has eliminated
service to 34 small Florida towns. By contrast, Trailways, the second largest carrier, has
significantly increased service in Florida since deregulation. As of October 8, 1980, Trailways
has added service to at least nine cities, while adding 1,621 miles traveled in Florida daily
and 12 full-time operators. Memorandum from Brian Deffenbaugh, Staff Attorney, Senate
Committee on Commerce, to Senator Dempsey Barron (Sept. 22, 1980).
286. A suit challenging the constitutionality of the deregulation of motor carriers was
filed on June 27, 1980, and subsequently amended on July 7, 1980 in Alterman Transp.
Lines, Inc. v. State, No. 80-1902 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Leon County July 29, 1980). The court dis-
missed the complaint with prejudice on July 29, and an appeal was filed on July 31, with the
First District Court of Appeal. Alterman Transp. Lines, Inc. v. State, No. WW-391 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App., filed July 31, 1980). The main argument on appeal is that the repeal of
chapter 323, without providing for a reasonable alternative and without a showing of over-
powering necessity for repeal is in violation of FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21: "The Courts shall be
open to every person for redress of any injury, and justice shall be administered without
sale, denial or delay." Brief for Appellant at 4, Alterman Transp. Lines, Inc. v. State, No.
WW-391 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App., filed July 31, 1980). The Appellants rely on the 1973 Flor-
ida Supreme Court case of Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973), which held the auto-
mobile no-fault law to be an unconstitutional denial of access to courts as it applied to suits
for physical damage. Id. at 4. The court in Kluger held that when a right of access to the
courts for redress for a particular injury had been provided by statute predating the adop-
tion of FLA. CONsT. art. I, the legislature could not abolish that right without providing a
reasonable alternative, unless the legislature could show an overpowering public necessity
for abolishing the right and that no alternative exists. 281 So. 2d at 1. Appellants allege that
the substantive rights provided by chapter 323 were abolished without providing a reasona-
ble alternative or a finding of overpowering public necessity. Brief for Appellant at 6.
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The case will probably turn on the question of whether the "rights" provided in ch. 323
were rights for redress of a particular injury or, instead, were rights of a different nature,
such as the right to be free from competition for which there is no guarantee. See ASI, Inc.
v. Florida Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 334 So. 2d 594, 596 (Fla. 1976).
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